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ABSTRACT
NORD STREAM 2: THE GAS CURTAIN OF EUROPE
Sarah Elizabeth Nelson
Old Dominion University, 2022
Director: Dr. Regina Karp

The debate over the 1,200 kilometer Nord Stream 2 pipeline, capable of delivering 110
billion cubic meters of liquified natural gas (LNG) under the Baltic Sea directly from Russia to
Germany, has received global attention since its declaration of intent in 2015. The Nord Stream 2
pipeline is not only significant for the contestation it has created within the European Union but
for the divisions it has deepened in the U.S.-German transatlantic alliance. Specifically, many
European countries, with an emphasis on Ukraine, and the United States view the pipeline as a
Kremlin-instigated operation to exploit Europe’s vulnerability to energy demand to achieve its
own strategic objective to weaken European energy security and undermine the western liberal
order. Meanwhile, Germany views the pipeline as a pragmatic economic project to ensure a
reliable energy supply, both for Germany and the European Union.
As a test case to build a critique of interdependence theory, Nord Stream 2: The Gas
Curtain of Europe, also makes up for the current lack of research and analysis on the
development of Nord Stream 2 by providing qualitative explanations for how we debate Nord
Stream 2, the geopolitical challenges posed by the pipeline, and finally, what the pipeline means
for European energy security. This thesis states two conclusions. First, that the completion of the
Nord Stream 2 pipeline was possible due to a history of interdependencies between Europe and
Russia, specifically, Germany and Russia. Second, contrary to what interdependence theory
suggests, due to the current environment in Europe and Germany’s response to Russia’s second

invasion of Ukraine on February 24, 2022, the interdependencies between Germany and Russia
have disintegrated and the likelihood of regaining a stable relationship of interdependence is
incumbent upon the future outcome of the situation in Europe and specifically, Ukraine.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
As the second-largest producer of natural gas, and largest European exporter of energy, 1
Russia has grounded its foreign policy in its gas producing and exporting capabilities. The Russian
Federation is strategic in utilizing gas to achieve its foreign policy initiatives, and arguably, the
key factor in advancing Russia as a superpower, both during the Cold War and today, in the
multipolar world order. Because of Russia’s history as a gas monopoly, and the increasing
importance of energy security on the international stage, Nord Stream 2 was not and will not
become the only Kremlin-operated pipeline. Therefore, it is crucial to understand the cause and
effect of Nord Stream 2 through close analysis of its developmental period from 2015-2021, so
that scholars, policymakers, and international institutions are armed with an arsenal of knowledge
on how to prevent or, at best, monitor Russian-controlled pipelines disguised as international
economic projects.
Through the combined application of International Relations (IR) theory and qualitative,
historical methods of analysis, Nord Stream 2: The Gas Curtain of Europe answers the following
research question: how do we debate Nord Stream 2 and what does the pipeline mean for European
security, U.S. transatlantic relations, U.S.-German relations, and relations within the European
Union (EU) through the lens of interdependence theory? While highlighting the divisions Nord
Stream 2 has deepened within Europe and the transatlantic alliance, this thesis also brings to light
the limitations of interdependence theory, revealing how the theory of interdependence does not
provide sufficient framework for conceptualizing international relations following the Nord

1

Russian exports of energy to Europe include crude oil and condensate (49%), natural gas (74%) and coal (32%)
but for the purpose of this thesis and Nord Stream 2, “energy” refers to natural gas. U.S. Energy Information
Administration https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=51618
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Stream 2 pipeline’s completion in September 2021. Specifically, the historical and stable
relationship of interdependence between Germany and Russia has now entered into a crisis driven
state following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine on February 24, 2022 and Germany’s immediate
response to cancel the Nord Stream 2 pipeline. In other words, the former stable relationship of
interdependence between Germany and Russia, portrayed through the construction and completion
of the Nord Stream 2 pipeline, has been offset and destabilized due to Russia’s actions in Ukraine.
Due to the limitations of interdependence theory in framing Nord Stream 2 following its
construction’s completion in September 2021, this thesis hypothesizes that if the pipeline resumes
its certification process and becomes fully operational, then the EU and Russia will enter into either
another crisis driven or a balanced relationship of interdependence. This thesis provides an
explanation for both potential outcomes, including the likely paths the additional actors involved
in Nord Stream 2, specifically the United States and Ukraine, will take.
This thesis is divided according to the research on and analysis of Nord Stream 2.
Beginning with the research methodology, Chapter Two provides the necessary framework for the
reader to conceptualize how Nord Stream 2 surfaced in global discussion and political debate by
beginning with an in-depth analysis of the applied theory, its limitations, as well as the research
scope, research question and hypothesis. Chapter Two then transitions to a literary review of
interdependence theory (Keohane & Nye, 1977) and how interdependence theory provides
explanation for Europe’s energy dependence and its historical gas relationship with the Soviet
Union/Russia. Despite the interdependence model lacking in explaining the current situation
surrounding Nord Stream 2, interdependence theory provided the necessary framework for
understanding the phenomena of the Cold War gas relationship while simultaneously supporting
the Cold War Western European narrative of Ostpolitik.

3
Encompassing the main analysis of Nord Stream 2, Chapter Three answers the research
question on how we debate Nord Stream 2, as well as what the pipeline means for European
security, U.S. transatlantic relations, U.S.-German relations, and relations within the EU through
the lens of interdependence theory. Chapter Three is separated into three sections. The first two
sections include the analysis of the two historical case studies, the 1982 Siberian pipeline, and the
2012 Nord Stream pipeline. The analysis of these case studies provide the foundation for the
analysis of Nord Stream 2 and specifically, understanding the development, construction, and
completion of the pipeline in September 2021. Beginning with an analysis of Nord Stream 2
through the Russian and German lens, the last section of Chapter Three transitions to an analysis
of the pipeline’s opposition – the United States, Ukraine, and some EU member states. Chapter
Three concludes with an overview of the pipeline’s certification process following its construction
completion on September 9, 2021.
Due to Russia’s second full-scale invasion of Ukraine on February 24, 2022, the context
of Nord Stream 2 has changed and revealed the limitations of interdependence theory in providing
a contemporary framework for understanding EU-Russian gas relations. Even though the main
analysis remains within the bounds of 2015-2021, Chapter Three includes a closing analysis on
the likely outcome of Nord Stream 2, given the current environment with Russia’s military actions
in Ukraine. Chapter Four marks this thesis’ conclusion. Chapter Four restates the key findings of
this thesis, beginning with a concise historical overview of the EU-Russia and Germany-Russia
relationship and summary of the three case study analyses, Chapter Four concludes with a closing
statement on the current and forecasted future state of the Nord Stream 2 pipeline.

4

Figure 1 – Map Route of the Nord Stream 2 Pipeline
Source: Aljazeera, 2022
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CHAPTER 2
METHODOLOGY & LITERATURE REVIEW
2.1. Introduction
This chapter sets the stage for how we debate Nord Stream 2, the geopolitical challenges
to the pipeline, and what Nord Stream 2 means for energy security according to Russia, Germany,
and the EU. This chapter is divided into three sections. Section one begins with a discussion of the
thesis’ research methodology. Specifically, section one includes how data was collected, from
which sources, as well as the limitations to data collection. Most importantly, this section sets the
foundation for using Nord Stream 2 as a test case to build a critique of interdependence theory.
The next two sections incorporate an overview analysis of interdependence theory and a
literature review of how energy relations is organized within its theoretical framework.
Specifically, section two explains the significance of interdependence theory (Keohane & Nye,
1977), its contributions to International Relations (IR) theory, and how the theory provides a
foundational understanding for answering the research question of how we debate Nord Stream 2
until the pipeline’s cancellation in February 2022. The analysis of interdependence theory is
separated according to the types of interdependence, proposed by Keohane & Nye, as well as the
role of trust (Ziegler, 2012) in forming interdependencies. The in-depth analysis of
interdependence theory provides the reader with sufficient knowledge and ability to identify the
successes and limitations of interdependence theory revealed throughout this thesis.
Following the analytical breakdown of interdependence theory in section two, the chapter
transitions to the final section, with a literary review of the interdependencies formed between the
EU and the Soviet Union/Russia. Similar to the goals of educating the reader on interdependence
theory in the previous section, the literary review of how interdependence theory frames energy
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relations equips the reader with the knowledge to immediately recognize the interdependencies
having formed between the EU and Russia and especially, between Germany and Russia after a
decades-long evolution of a gas relationship. The literature review is organized around the
scholarly work of Bradshaw (2009), Colgan (2013), Apostolicas (2020), and Casier (2011).
Beginning with the challenges associated with energy relations and the complexity and emergence
of energy security in the political dialogue, the literature review transitions to an analysis of how
Europe understand its energy dependence on Russia, how its dependence was complicated by
changes in the global energy environment, and how Russia formed its own dependencies as an
energy supplier, or the notion that Russia’s economy was as wholly dependent on its revenues as
an exporter of energy as Europe was dependent on Russian energy experts.
2.2. Methodology
2.2.1. A Qualitative Approach to Nord Stream 2
All of the research conducted for Nord Stream 2: The Gas Curtain of Europe followed a
qualitative methodological approach because all data was collected from online or printed and
published literary sources. The collection of qualitative materials were combined for the main
analysis of Nord Stream 2 and applied when using Nord Stream 2 as a test case to build a critique
of interdependence theory. By choosing to critique the theory of interdependence through a study
of Nord Stream 2, this thesis is guarded against confirmation bias. In addition, by critiquing the
theory of interdependence, Nord Stream 2: The Gas Curtain of Europe sets limitations to the study
and the conducted research. In other words, there are multiple ways in which the Nord Stream 2
pipeline could be studied but for the purpose of this thesis and the relevance of interdependence
theory in framing the historical EU-Soviet/Russian relationship, Nord Stream 2 presents a test case
in which interdependence theory is challenged.

7
2.2.2. Data Collection and Sources
The majority of sources for data collection were from newspapers, both in the United States
and Europe. This was due to the lack of research and scholarly analysis on Nord Stream 2 and
because the pipeline has been central to global political debate and news media for over six years.
Fully available to the public, the newspaper sources were easily accessible for data collection on
Nord Stream 2. The data collection for all three case studies followed a template provided by
Hayes and Victor, 2004, as a part of a study conducted by the Baker Institute’s Geopolitics of Gas.
Following the template’s structure, the variables collected for all case studies were the historical
and technical details of the pipeline’s construction, as well as the economic and financial issues,
and the general investment climate within each proposed export and import country. 2
The lack of scholarly analysis on Nord Stream 2 was the greatest limitation to this study.
Despite this, there were substantial sources of scholarly analysis studying the cause and effects of
other energy policy issues. For example, analysis on energy security, historical disputes over
energy infrastructures, and how the battle for energy can lead to international conflict was collected
from multiple scholarly journals such as the journals of International Security, Georgetown
Journal of International Affairs, Journal of Transatlantic Studies, and the journal of Economics of
Energy and Environmental Policy. Since the debate over Nord Stream 2 was a global debate,
seizing significant attention in Europe, data was also collected from European journals such as the
Polish journal, Nowa Polityka Wschodnia, as well as a publication from the Institute of Strategic
Studies in Islamabad, Pakistan, and the International Issues & Slovak Foreign Policy Affairs. The
information retrieved from these sources demonstrated a substantial global response to Nord

2

Mark H. Hayes and David G. Victor. “Factors That Explain Investment in Cross-Border Natural Gas Transport
Infrastructures: A Research Protocol for Historical Case Studies.” Program on Energy and Sustainable
Development, February 2004, 2.
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Stream 2, as well as a strong understanding for why the debate over Nord Stream 2 is so significant,
due to its potential to either contribute to or detract from European energy security.
Other open sources that were relied on for data collection were books and online
presentations by energy experts, Daniel Yergin, Agnia Grigas, and Nataliya Esakova. Even though
only some of their work incorporated Nord Stream 2, as experts in the energy policy field, their
publications and presentations offered the necessary foundation for understanding the complexity
of energy relations, especially within the United States and Europe, which in turn, helped fuel the
debate surrounding Nord Stream 2 and other historical, Russian instigated pipelines. Together, the
collection of open-source and qualitative data provided the foundation for utilizing Nord Stream 2
as a test case to build a critique of interdependence theory.
2.2.3. The Research Question and Hypothesis
Through the combined application of IR theory and qualitative, historical methods of
analysis, Nord Stream 2: The Gas Curtain of Europe answers the following research question: how
do we debate Nord Stream 2 and what does the pipeline mean for European security, U.S.
transatlantic relations, U.S.-German relations, and relations within the EU through the lens of
interdependence theory? As a critique of interdependence theory, this thesis also identifies the
limitations of interdependence theory and hypothesizes that if Nord Stream 2 becomes fully
operational, then the EU and Russia will enter into either another crisis driven relationship of
interdependence or regain another balanced relationship of interdependence.
The purpose of this research is to better understand the actions and decisions made from
2015-2021 during the inception, design, and construction of Nord Stream 2, as well as the impact
the pipeline has had on Western alliances and the future of energy security in Europe. This thesis
begins with an analysis of the 1982 Siberian pipeline and 2012 original Nord Stream pipeline by
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approaching the two pipelines as two case studies of the interdependence theory and the EUSoviet/Russian relationship of interdependence. Having emerged within a new world order
organized around multilateral institutions with a primary focus on energy relations in foreign
policy, these historical case studies are significant to this thesis for two reasons. First, they lay the
foundation for understanding the sequence of events across the main research scope of 2015-2021
and the development of Nord Stream 2. Specific to the second case study on Nord Stream, the
development of the Nord Stream pipeline contributes to this thesis’ critique of interdependence
theory by highlighting the theory’s failure to prevent the emergence of a new narrative during the
conception and development of the original Nord Stream pipeline. In other words, by the time the
original Nord Stream pipeline was introduced to European geopolitics, the efficacy of
interdependence theory had lessened because the geopolitical relationship between the EU and
Russia had changed, or been removed from the old, Cold War narrative of a stable relationship of
interdependence that had served the EU and the Soviet Union, and provided for the creation of the
1982 Siberian pipeline.
Together, the two historical case studies of the Siberian and original Nord Stream pipelines
demonstrated the European successes or attempts to reclaim the successes of interdependence
theory. The construction, completion, and cancellation of Nord Stream 2, however, presents a
unique opportunity for utilizing the pipeline as a case study for exposing the limitations of
interdependence theory and its decreasing applicability in framing energy relations. By the 21st
century and with the global emergence of a competing narrative to interdependence theory,
interdependence theory could no longer independently frame and support the development of the
Nord Stream 2 pipeline. In other words, the increasing importance of the competing narrative
surrounding energy security in energy relations injured the credibility of interdependence theory
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and subsequently, much of Western Europe’s support and reliance on the historic Cold War theory.
The limitations of interdependence theory as well as the increasing significance and relevance of
the competing narrative centered around energy security came to a head with the cancellation and
current stalemate of Nord Stream 2.
This research is important because energy will remain central to national security due to
every society’s dependence on energy. Even though the term “energy” has been coined to describe
gas, oil, and other petroleum products, for the purpose of this thesis, the term “energy” will
correspond to natural gas. This research will also remain important for the foreseeable future for
two main reasons. First, as states seek to enrich their energy supply through reliable suppliers and
develop cleaner sources of energy, energy policy will continue to play a central role in national
security and foreign policy. Second, for as long as liberal democracies are threatened in the U.S.
and Europe, it is necessary to understand the precious implications of projects such as Nord Stream
2, the interdependencies and variations of trust which helped create the pipeline, as well as the
steps to ensure energy security in Europe while simultaneously maintaining Western alliances and
European liberal democracies.
2.2.4. The Research Scope
The research scope will be divided across periods of the 20th and 21st century. In the
following chapter, the research scope includes two historical case studies of the 1982 Siberian
pipeline and the 2012 Nord Stream pipeline. The case studies, accompanied by a historical review
of EU-Soviet/Russian gas relations and EU-U.S. transatlantic relations are significant because they
demonstrate an intermixing of energy security and geopolitics, as seen today with the Nord Stream
2 pipeline.
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The research and qualitative analysis of the two historical case studies will form the basis
for the third case study and main analysis of Nord Stream 2 and its research scope of 2015-2021.
The main analysis and research scope of Nord Stream 2 spans longitudinally from June 2015, when
the first multilateral non-binding agreement on the expansion of the original Nord Stream pipeline
concluded at the Economic Forum to September 2021, when the Nord Stream 2 pipeline finished
construction.
2.3. Theoretical Framework
When traditional theories of international relations cannot sufficiently explain emerging
patterns of change, new theories are introduced. The political and economic phenomena of the
mid-1970s inspired Keohane and Nye to develop the theory of interdependence. But despite being
a “new” addition, interdependence theory has a foundation in traditional IR theory, specifically,
realism and liberalism. For example, Keohane and Nye argue that when states create a relationship
of interdependence, they manipulate the system as much as possible for their own benefit in order
to increase their power and security, a key feature of realism. However, states also engage in
interdependent relationships as an opportunity to engage in mutually beneficial trade, thereby
creating or strengthening a bilateral relationship, a key feature of liberalism. Therefore,
interdependence theory recognizes both the importance and shortcomings of traditional IR theory,
by creating a modern synthesis of realist and liberalist ideologies to yield new explanations for
changing patterns in world affairs.
Interdependence theory is based on the assumption that economics yields greater power in
dictating world affairs than the forces traditional theory suggests, for example, military force.
Interdependence means “mutual dependence” and “refers to situations characterized by reciprocal
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effects among countries or among actors in different countries.” 3 Examples of the new phenomena
which inspired the creation of interdependence theory was the decrease in the influence of military
power in world affairs and the increase in the power and influence of international institutions and
global trade economies. By the 1970s, military power remained an important pillar of foreign
policy, however it did not explain the emerging complexities in “politics of global
interdependence”. As Henry Kissinger noted, “the balance among major powers, the security of
nations – no longer defines our perils and possibilities … Now we are entering a new era. Old
international patterns are crumbling; old slogans are uninstructive; old solutions are unavailing.
The world has become interdependent in economies, in communications, in human aspirations.” 4
2.3.1. Choosing the Interdependence Theory
Besides choosing interdependence theory to critique for its limitations with explaining the
current phenomena of Nord Stream 2, the theory of interdependence was also chosen because it
has proven itself to be the best theoretical framework for this thesis for three reasons. First, unlike
the traditional realist ideology, interdependence theory provides an opportunity to understand the
complexity of energy, its power capabilities, and its significant influence on world affairs and
states’ bilateral relations. Specifically, the interdependence model provides the necessary
theoretical framework for close analysis of the historical background between Russia and the EU,
and specifically Russia and Germany. Second, the interdependence model has a history of serving
both Europe and the Soviet Union during the Cold War. In other words, during the Cold War,
Europe and the Soviet Union established energy relations that gradually solidified into a
relationship of interdependence.

3
4

Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye. Power and Interdependence. Fourth Edition. Longman, 2012, 8.

Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye. Power and Interdependence. Second Edition. Harper Collins Publishers,
1989, 4.
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The historical relationship of interdependence between the Soviet Union/Russia and
Germany are further analyzed in the two case studies of the 1982 Siberian pipeline and 2012 Nord
Stream pipeline. Even though the relationship of interdependence between Russia and Germany
had evolved and was being challenged by an emerging narrative by the time the 2012 Nord Stream
pipeline was introduced to Europe, the interdependencies between the two regions remained
significant to still be recognized throughout the construction of the original Nord Stream pipeline.
Third and finally, the interdependence model is the best theoretical framework for this
thesis because the model has extensive experience explaining geopolitical shifts in the global gas
market. Examples include the 1973 oil shock when Arab producers cut off energy supply to the
West in retaliation for their support of Israel during the Yom Kippur War and the effects of the
2008 global financial crisis. Specifically, these events exposed the centrality of energy relations in
geopolitics by portraying the costs states suffered when energy relations and/or energy supply were
compromised.
2.3.2. The Types of Interdependence
Keohane and Nye match the various complexities of state behaviors with various types of
interdependence, including sensitivity interdependence and vulnerability interdependence.
Sensitivity interdependence correlates to the degree in which states are affected by changes in a
particular issue area. 5 Sensitivity interdependence can be measured by analyzing the costly effects
of transactional changes created by interactions between various state policies. 6 Within a
sensitivity interdependence scenario, a degree of responsiveness within a policy framework is

5

Waheeda Rana. “Theory of Complex Interdependence: A Comparative Analysis of Realist and Neoliberal
Thoughts.” International Journal of Business and Social Science 6, no. 2 (February 2015), 294.
https://www.ijbssnet.com/journals/Vol_6_No_2_February_2015/33.pdf.
6

Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye. Power and Interdependence. Second Edition. Harper Collins Publishers,
1989, 12.

14
necessary. For example, governments must analyze how quickly one country brings costly changes
to another, and how great those costly effects are. Sensitivity interdependence assumes state
policies remain stagnant. Therefore, any changes could result in costly effects, encouraging states
to refrain from policy changes.
Vulnerability interdependence correlates to the extent in which states are able to control
their response to their sensitivity interdependence, or “an actor’s liability to suffer costs imposed
by external events even after policies have been altered.” 7 Vulnerability interdependence can be
measured by the costs governments must face if alternative policies are available and taken. In
other words, determining vulnerability starts by analyzing how or if altered policies would result
in sufficient quantities of a certain material, and at what cost.
Comparative analysis correlates vulnerability and sensitivity interdependence to the realist
term, “balance of power”. Introduced to IR theory in 1978 by Hans J. Morgenthau, “the balance
of power and policies aiming at its preservation are not only inevitable but are an essential
stabilizing factor in a society of sovereign nations; and the instability of international Balance of
Power is due not to the faultiness of the principle but to the particular conditions under which the
principle must operate in a society of sovereign nations.”8 Incorporating interdependence theory,
interdependencies have the potential to serve as an “essential stabilizing factor”. An example of
an interdependent relationship serving as an “essential stabilizing factor” was West Germany’s gas
relationship with the Soviet Union during the Cold War. The statement, “the instability of

7

Waheeda Rana. “Theory of Complex Interdependence: A Comparative Analysis of Realist and Neoliberal
Thoughts.” International Journal of Business and Social Science 6, no. 2 (February 2015), 294.
https://www.ijbssnet.com/journals/Vol_6_No_2_February_2015/33.pdf.
8

Waheeda Rana. “Theory of Complex Interdependence: A Comparative Analysis of Realist and Neoliberal
Thoughts.” International Journal of Business and Social Science 6, no. 2 (February 2015), 294.
https://www.ijbssnet.com/journals/Vol_6_No_2_February_2015/33.pdf.
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international Balance of Power is due to particular conditions” could be rewritten to incorporate
interdependence theory as “the instability of interdependent relationships is due to particular cases
of sensitivity and vulnerability interdependence.”

Therefore, vulnerability and sensitivity

interdependencies can offset the “balance of power” Morgenthau proposed. For example, and
specific to sensitivity interdependence, changes in one state’s policies could negatively affect
another state, possibly causing a redistribution of power if the state receiving the policy changes
has a poor response. Specific to vulnerability interdependence, the state which responds poorly to
another state’s altered policies could be taken advantage of. One state taking advantage of the
sensitivity of another state could place the vulnerable state lower on the global “balance of power”
scale.
2.3.3. The Role of Trust in Interdependencies
There are examples of trust emerging as an influential factor in IR, most noticeably in
liberalism, where trust is discussed and applied as an essential factor in determining bilateral
relations. But there is little inclusion of trust in realism because of the inability to measure trust in
terms of power or as a numerical value. For the purpose of this thesis, a concrete definition of trust
will replace its inability to be measured in numerical terms, believing a definition will work well
with the qualitative layout of this thesis. The chosen definition is provided by Charles E. Ziegler
as trust being “one’s willingness to place one’s interests under the control of others in a particular
context, on the assumption that the trustee will not exploit the trustor’s vulnerability.” 9 Because
there are risks involved in establishing trust, theorists argue that trust will emerge in a relationship

9

Charles E. Ziegler. “Energy Pipeline Networks and Trust: The European Union and Russia in Comparative
Perspective.” International Relations 27, no. 1 (2012), 8.
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between those states that are similar. 10 This idea is significant when analyzing the trust factor in
the EU-Soviet/Russian relationship considering the lack of similarities between the two regions.
Ziegler’s definition of trust resonates with the theory of interdependence in that the
sensitivity and vulnerability interdependencies of a state would be minor or less detrimental to a
state’s autonomy if the involved parties maintained a “trustful” relationship. In other words, there
would be a lesser threat of one party in an interdependent relationship exploiting the vulnerabilities
of the other party if both parties maintained similar strategic objectives and communication. The
lack of trust and communication would encourage one party to capitalize on the vulnerabilities of
the other, forcing both parties to enter into a defensive position and subsequently, creating a
geopolitical atmosphere of paranoia.
2.4. Literature Review
The complexity of energy relations and the question of where energy security fits in a
state’s foreign policy continues to challenge governments and policymakers. Until the mid-1970s,
energy security was not a commonly used term because energy was viewed from an economic
perspective and not from a political or national security perspective. The emergence of energy
security in the political dialogue has resulted in multiple sources of literature calling for the
imperative need to re-interpret and expand the geopolitics of energy security, specifically within
the EU because of its reliance on Russian energy exports. The subsequent literature reviews build
upon the global discussion surrounding energy security, energy relations, and specifically, the
energy relations between the EU and Russia.

10

Charles E. Ziegler. “Energy Pipeline Networks and Trust: The European Union and Russia in Comparative
Perspective.” International Relations 27, no. 1 (2012), 8.

17
2.4.1. Energy Relations and Energy Security Challenges in Europe
Michael J. Bradshaw’s 2009 publication, “The Geopolitics of Global Energy Security”
highlights three key issues on energy relations; that there is a global shift in demand for energy, a
growing mismatch between the geographies of supply and demand, and the rise in natural gas. 11
Most importantly, Bradshaw views energy as a security issue and believes Europe’s reliance on
Russian gas is the greatest of energy security concerns that needs to be immediately addressed.
Jeff D. Colgan’s 2013 publication, “Fueling the Fire: Pathways from Oil to War” expands upon
Bradshaw’s analysis of energy as as security issue by studying whether and why oil leads to war
and international conflict and demonstrates the importance for scholars and policymakers to
understand the causal mechanisms for which energy (in this case, oil) affects international security.
Even though Colgan does not think oil is the sole cause of international conflict, he argues that the
oil industry has helped shape international conflict in many ways, 12 and therefore calls for the
energy-security relationship to be re-interpreted and expanded upon.
Together in their analyses, Bradshaw and Colgan highlight changes in the global energy
environment, specifically, the risks and dangers associated with energy relations, and states’
imperative to increase their energy security through establishing a diverse and reliable range of
energy suppliers. Even though Bradshaw and Colgan addressed the complexity of energy relations
and the challenges to defining energy security, the interdependence theory is effective enough to
provide a sufficient framework for understanding and analyzing energy relations and energy
security through the relationship of interdependence between the EU and Russia and specifically,
the interdependence between Germany and Russia.
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2.4.2. The EU-Russian Relationship of Interdependence
In his 2011 publication, “The Rise of Energy to the Top of the EU-Russia Agenda: From
Interdependence to Dependence” scholar Tom Casier looks at how energy has emerged in political
discourse and into the realm of national security. Specifically, by applying aspects of
interdependence theory, Casier relays four criteria that define energy relations in security terms.
Those criteria include the supply vulnerability of the EU, Russia’s dependence on EU’s energy
demand, energy’s position on the global “power agenda”, and the utilization of energy as a weapon.
2.4.2.1. Vulnerabilities: The EU
In Power and Interdependence, Keohane and Nye state interdependence occurs “when
there are reciprocal (although not necessarily symmetrical) costly effects of transactions.” 13 The
“costly effects” of these transactions correlate to the two types or dimensions of interdependence,
vulnerability and sensitivity. Sensitivity involves a degree of responsiveness, or specifically, how
quickly one country responds to another country’s costly actions. Vulnerability refers to the
aftermath of those decisions or specifically, whether a country has the ability to suffer the imposed
costs or the presence of available alternatives. If there are minimal or no viable alternatives and/or
a country is unable to suffer the costs, that country’s vulnerability is high. According to Caiser,
the EU’s vulnerability to energy relations with Russia is high because the EU is “no doubt to a
considerable extent dependent on Russian energy.”14 The EU, and specifically its energy supply,
is vulnerable because the EU lacks diversification of energy suppliers. In the previously mentioned
2009 publication by Michael J. Bradshaw, Bradshaw labels Europe’s reliance on Russian gas a

13

Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye. Power and Interdependence. Second Edition. Harper Collins Publishers,
1989, 9.
14

Tom Casier. “The Rise of Energy to the Top of the EU-Russia Agenda: From Interdependence to Dependence?”
Geopolitics 16, no. 3 (2011): 536–52, 542.

19
security challenge with little alternatives. For example, Bradshaw highlights Europe’s gas
producing abilities but due to decline in domestic production, specifically through the increasingly
depleted British North Sea and Dutch gas fields,15 Europe’s reliance on gas imports has increased.
Therefore, whether due to the lack of sufficient European gas production, the lack of alternative
suppliers, or the lack of desire to search or develop alternative suppliers, the EU considers Russia
as the only option for an energy supplier.
2.4.2.2. Vulnerabilities: Russia
Casier explains a relationship of interdependence as a kind of paradox, summed in the
following quote, “A normal view of power politics and related issues of economics is that an
energy supplier will hold tremendous power and influence over an energy user… But the opposite
can also be true, as the user acquires power and influence over the supplier.” 16
In other words, both parties in a relationship of interdependence have some kind of power
over the other. But this delicate balance of power can be offset at any moment, especially if the
parties involved maintain a low level of trust, as is the case with the EU-Russia energy relations
because of the addition of new member states to the Union in 2004, like Poland, who take a strictly
defensive approach to Russia. The variations of opinion towards Russia also creates difficulties in
developing a uniform EU energy policy, subsequently contributing to the EU’s vulnerability.
The literature notes the EU’s significant vulnerability with its regional energy supply and
dependence on Russian energy exports. However, Casier adds how Russia also maintains a level
of vulnerability. For example, Casier argues that similar to how the EU is dependent on energy
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exports from Russia, Russia is dependent on the EU’s energy demand, so much so, that if the EU
were to cut off trade with Russia, the Russian economy would “simply collapse.” 17 Paul
Apostolicas in his 2020 publication, “Evolving Markets: LNG and Energy Security in Europe”
highlights this same idea that Russia is as just dependent (if not more) on Europe’s energy demand
than the EU is on Russian energy imports. Specifically, Apostolicas argues against Europe’s
“phobia” of Russia’s monopoly gas firm, Gazprom, acting in ways which would jeopardize or
lessen Russia’s gas revenues. He adds, “the demonization of Gazprom appears to be more based
on political agendas than reality.”18 According to Apostolicas and Casier, the EU eliminating gas
trade with Russia, thereby crippling Russia’s economy, is a weapon as feared by the Russians as
the European fear of Russia weaponizing gas through the Kremlin-operated pipelines.
The emergence of energy onto the global stage has also correlated a state’s energy supply
to significant power capabilities. As the largest exporter of energy to Europe, Russia would be
deemed as a state with great power capabilities. Even though Russia is an energy superpower,
Caiser questions the true power capabilities of Russia considering Russia’s economy19 and soft
power lacks significantly in comparison to the EU, or power capabilities that are definitive of the
21st century. In addition, even if Russia is an energy superpower, there is no guarantee that Russia
can maintain its gas producing capabilities. Therefore, Casier adds, “if the EU needs to be worried
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about something, it is not about Russia cutting off gas, but it is about Russia being unable to sustain
its future production.”20
2.4.2.3. The Weaponization of Gas
Casier addresses how the increasing focus on energy in political discourse has caused the
idea of energy security to become a contributing factor of a state or region’s national security. The
question of enhancing European energy security has been made difficult by shifting identities and
perceptions of EU-Russia energy relations, especially with the expansion of the EU in 2004 and
with it, the addition of multiple different perceptions of Russia. Despite the collapse of the
communist regime of the Soviet Union in 1990, Russia adopted a more aggressive and assertive
energy policy by the turn of the century while the EU struggled to develop its own unified energy
policy approach to Russia. With the combination of these factors, little was done to alleviate both
the geopolitical tensions and competition encompassing energy relations.
With the emergence of energy security onto the global stage, states also questioned the
likelihood of states, specifically Russia, utilizing energy as a weapon. The relationship of
interdependence the EU and Russia have entered into because of Russia’s energy capabilities and
the EU’s need for energy is critiqued by some in the EU and the United States because the EU is
risking Russia wielding the energy weapon. According to Casier, utilizing the gas weapon is
dependent upon certain circumstances since, as previously stated, Russia has as much vulnerability
as the EU in their relationship of interdependence. Casier lists the reasons why Russia would wield
the energy weapon, “On its own, Russian energy dominance is a necessary but insufficient
explanation for alleging that energy is a tool of Russian foreign policy. The addition of an external
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political goal however represents a sufficient factor.”21 Casier adds that the decision to utilize
energy as a weapon comes with great costs to both parties. Therefore, if Russia were to weaponize
energy, it would be for the purpose of achieving a significant and strategic foreign policy objective,
or one whose benefits outweighed the costs of weaponizing energy. Apostolicas also adds in his
2020 publication on energy security in Europe that any Kremlin instigated cutoff of gas to Europe
would solidify Europe’s mistrust in Russia, resulting in political consequences contrary to Putin’s
geopolitical goals.22
Even though many in the West oppose and question the security of Europe’s dependence
on Russian energy, Casier finds little support to define the dependence on the import of Russian
energy as an European energy security issue because Russia has as much to gain, and lose, as the
EU from EU-Russia energy relations. That is to say, the four criteria Casier relays in his analysis
solidifies the EU and Russia into a relationship of interdependence. In other words, both the EU
and Russia have significant vulnerabilities that forces them to maintain their relationship of
interdependence because the costs of abandoning the relationship, for reasons associated with a
lack of trust, are greater than the risks involved with maintaining a delicate relationship of
interdependence.
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CHAPTER 3
APPLICATION & ANALYSIS
3.1. Introduction
This chapter is divided into three sections, each correlating to a case study analysis within
the theoretical framework of interdependence theory. Section one and two encompass the analysis
of the 1982 Siberian pipeline, also referred to as the Yamal-Europe pipeline, and the original 2012
Nord Stream pipeline. As prime historical examples of the evolution of an interdependent
relationship between the Soviet Union/Russia and Europe, the 1982 Siberian pipeline and 2012
Nord Stream pipeline case studies lay the groundwork for the final analysis on Nord Stream 2 as
a test case to build a critique of interdependence theory. The historical case studies follow the
structure outlined by Hayes and Victor, 2004, as a part of a study conducted by the Baker Institute’s
Geopolitics of Gas. Hayes and Victor question whether the construction and operation of large
international networks of pipelines are politically and economically feasible, when these pipelines
would cross contested borders and suggest that shared infrastructure projects in such an
environment are not often attractive to private investors. 23 In other words, what are the factors
which explain the risks involved in a cross-border gas transport project? The specific variables
collected for the research of the 1982 Siberian pipeline and 2012 Nord Stream pipeline are the
historical and technical details of the pipelines’ construction, economic and financial issues, and
the general investment climate within each proposed export and import country. The data results
are incorporated into the subsequent section as significant contributions to the debate on Nord
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Stream 2, as well as what the pipeline means for European security, U.S. transatlantic relations,
U.S.-German relations, and relations within the EU.
Section three follows a chronological time horizon, encompassing the final case study and
main analysis of Nord Stream 2, and the stages of progression from its inception in June 2015 to
the pipeline’s completion in September 2021. Section three is separated into sub-sections, with
each section taking an analytical approach to Nord Stream 2 from the European, American, and
Russian position. The European position will be separated according to the perspectives of the
European Commission of the European Parliament, the Baltic States, and Ukraine. Following the
different regional perspectives of Nord Stream 2, section three transitions to highlight the
similarities between the 1982 Siberian pipeline and Nord Stream 2 pipeline and specifically, the
repetition of U.S. policy in Europe.
Contrary to the outcomes interdependence theory suggests, the current context surrounding
Nord Stream 2 has changed due to the environment in Europe. The interdependencies between the
EU and Russia and specifically Germany and Russia, were eliminated in a matter of one day due
to German Chancellor Olaf Scholz’s decision to cancel Nord Stream 2 immediately following
Russia’s second invasion of Ukraine on February 24, 2022. Despite interdependence theory’s
failure to explain the shift in the pipeline’s trajectory, section three closes with an analysis of the
steps the United States and Europe took to prepare for the certification and operation of Nord
Stream 2 during the scope of 2019-February 2022, since the steps demonstrated a significant
American and European commitment to compromise.
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3.2. Case Study 1 – The 1982 Siberian Pipeline
3.2.1. The Power of Energy
Throughout the 1970s and early 1980s, the “new” resource which produced the most global
power was energy and specifically, gas. 24 Shifting away from realist ideology, a state’s power was
no longer solely dictated by military capabilities but also by its ability to export gas through
significant gas producing capabilities or through reliable gas trade relationships. American energy
expert, Daniel Yergin stated, “Energy is not only one of the biggest industries in the world, but it’s
fundamental to making the world go round. It involves everything from new technologies to the
strategies of nations to political turmoil. So it’s a key factor in shaping our world.” 25 By the second
half of the 20th century, the world needed energy. This global dependence on gas and necessity to
develop relations with energy rich countries created relationships of dependence. As an energy
rich country, the Soviet Union had the ability to provide Europe with the necessary amounts of
energy. Following events like the 1967 Arab-Israeli War, and the disruption to Middle Eastern
energy exports, the Soviet Union seized the opportunity to portray its gas as a more affordable,
reliable, and competitive alternative source of energy to the long history of Middle Eastern exports.
3.2.2. Historical Memory: The Soviet-German Relationship
Since the end of World War II, Germany has maintained a softer approach to the Soviet
Union/Russia than any of its western allies. President of the German Association for East European
Studies, Ruprecht Polenz, believes the continuation of a weaker German response – in comparison
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to its western allies – to Soviet/Russian aggression was due to three misconceptions: 1) German
guilt as a result of the Nazi atrocities inflicted upon the East and the strikingly high numbers of
Soviet deaths during World War II; 2) Gorbachev allowing German reunification; and the 3)
national belief that Russia needs to be included in European security arrangements in order to
strengthen European security. 26 Addressing these misconceptions, most of the victims of the Third
Reich live in Bela-Russia and Ukraine. Polish Prime Minister Mateusz Morawiecki also rebuked
Germany’s support for Nord Stream 2 as compensation for Nazi atrocities by highlighting how the
pipeline threatens Poland, another victim of Nazi Germany. In February 2021, he stated, “Nord
Stream 2 is the worst possible form of compensation. Its implementation will not clear any
historical accounts. It will only improve the balance on the current bank accounts of the project's
shareholders … It is an investment that damages European solidarity.”27 But this sense of German
guilt has weighed so heavily on German-Soviet/Russian relations that it has caused both the
German government and public to label Russia as a victim rather than an aggressor. 28 Secondly,
the credit given to Gorbachev for Germany’s reunification is overestimated when more credit was
due to the work of U.S. Presidents Ronald Reagan and George H.W. Bush. Lastly, the German
belief that Russia needed to be included in western discussions on European security was the result
of the German public regarding Russia as Germany’s most important eastern neighbor. 29
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3.2.3. The Power of Ostpolitik
The greatest contributor to the successful completion and operation of the 1982 Siberian
pipeline was the West German approach of Ostpolitik. The Western Europeans, especially the
Germans, viewed the 1982 Siberian pipeline as a form of détente with the USSR, a policy of
Ostpolitik, or the “means to overcome the Cold War divide and gradually transform European
relations.”30 Former West German Chancellor Willy Brandt (1969-1974) established Ostpolitik or
Wandel durch Annäherung (change by rapprochement) as the central theme for West German
foreign policy in 1970. The new “east policy” grounded itself in the belief that engagement with
the Soviet Union through trade was a brilliant form of détente that had the capability to soften the
Soviet grip over East Germany, potentially leading to Germany’s reunification. From a European
perspective, establishing gas trade relations with the Soviet Union would soften the harsh, postStalin Soviet foreign policy and bring the Soviets closer to the West. In his analysis of the former
Soviet sphere of influence, Douglas E. Selvage explained Brandt’s reasoning behind Ostpolitik as
the following, “Brandt adopted the tactic of recognizing the status quo in East Central Europe de
facto in order to eventually overcome it by peaceful means.” 31 Specific to the West German-Soviet
relationship, Western German gas relations created a more relaxed policy towards Eastern Europe,
encouraging more communication or strategic dialogue between the East and the West.
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Unlike the Europeans, the American President during the time of the pipeline’s
construction, Ronald Reagan, viewed détente as “weak policy” 32 and the opposite policy agenda
for increasing European energy security. The concept of Ostpolitik also frustrated the United
States. In return for U.S. military protection, Germany was a vital partner, which served U.S.
interests during the Cold War. From the U.S. perspective, the appeal of substantial and cheap
Soviet gas threatened to distract Germany from acting as the eyes and ears of the U.S. by luring
Germany closer to a Soviet dictated dialogue in Europe.
3.2.4. The Evolution of the 1982 Siberian Pipeline
The Soviet Union had initiated a “gas for pipes” agreement with Western Europe at the
beginning of the 1970s. The agreement provided Western Europe with pipelines and the Soviet
Union access to western technology and equipment that was necessary for expanding and
developing its gas industry. The U.S. viewed the “gas for pipes” agreement as the EU entrusting
the Soviet Union to meet its energy needs as a reliable and trustworthy trade partner. But the EU
viewed the relationship from a different angle. From a European standpoint, the relationship was
not built on trust but on a relationship of interdependence and one does not guarantee the other.
Despite warnings from the U.S. regarding the inevitable growing European dependence on Soviet
gas, Western Europe maintained interdependent relations with the Soviet Union because of the
belief that they had more bargaining power in terms of settling gas contracts with the Soviets.
The heavy influence of Ostpolitik, or the West German approach based on dialogue and
economic cooperation with the Soviet Union combined with Europe’s energy needs, created the
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perfect opportunity for the construction and operation of a Soviet pipeline. These goals and needs
of the West German government were carried out when Germany lent the Soviet Union $4.75
billion towards the Siberian pipeline’s total cost of $10 to $15 billion in July 1980. 33 But the “gas
for pipes” agreement reached its height in November 1981, with the signing of the Yamal deal
contract between General Secretary of the Communist Party of the USSR Leonid Brezhnev and
Chancellor of West Germany, Helmut Schmidt. Moscow and Bonn called it “the deal of the
century”, estimating to provide the Soviet Union with up to $22 billion in annual revenue. 34
Following the agreement, the Siberian pipeline began construction in 1982.
The pipeline has become known for causing the significant dispute between the U.S. and
Europe and especially, between President Ronald Reagan and British Prime Minister Margaret
Thatcher. But Western Europe’s need for gas and their desire to reduce dependence on the
Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC)35 recruited significant Western European
support for the pipeline, despite U.S. objection, who viewed the pipeline as a Soviet scheme to
infiltrate the western lines of democracy. According to Western Europeans in support of the
pipeline, the project offered greater energy security, employment opportunities, and lower gas
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prices. Following the oil shocks of 1973 36 and 1979,37 Western Europe sought a more reliable
supplier than the Middle East. Contrary to U.S. opinion, that “reliable supplier” was seen as the
Soviet Union. The pipeline also offered tens of thousands of jobs during a global recession 38 for
citizens of France, Italy, the United Kingdom, and West Germany. 39 Following the theory of
interdependence and the characteristics of Ostpolitik, Western Europe also viewed gas trade with
the Soviet Union as a positive, believing that the hard currency the Soviet Union earned from the
sale of gas would be used to purchase European goods. Finally, despite President Reagan’s
attempts to export American coal or provide Germany with nuclear power, Soviet gas was the
cheapest option, contributing to the Western European mindset that the Siberian gas pipeline was
a strategic economic and commercial venture.
The greatest opposition to the 1982 Siberian pipeline was the United States and
specifically, the administration under President Ronald Reagan, who viewed the pipeline as the
first stake in European energy security. Ronald Reagan entered the White House in 1981, intent
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on adopting a Cold War strategy of “we win, they [Soviets] lose.” 40 The Reagan Administration
“re-froze the Cold War”41 by increasing the defense budget for five consecutive years, an action
that had not been taken since the beginning of the Cold War. According to declassified documents
produced by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), the 1982 Siberian pipeline would give the
Soviets political leverage over the West, 42 threatening Europe’s solidarity with the United States
on key foreign policy issues like economic sanctions, East-West tensions, and expansion of the
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Additionally, the project would equip the Soviet
Union with the financial means to expand gas production through greater investment in gas
producing technologies, a direct threat to American made equipment. A boost in the Soviet
economy could also aid malign Soviet activity.
Reagan believed an American victory could be achieved by exploiting economic
weaknesses of the Soviet Union through significant U.S. pressure on the Soviet energy industry. 43
In line with the literature review highlighting the Soviet Union’s reliance on energy revenue as a
vulnerability, one way to ensure an American victory over the Soviet Union was through its
economy, and specifically, its gas customers. Despite his disregard for the project, President
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Reagan delayed in imposing sanctions, allowing time for American company General Electric to
ship equipment necessary for pipeline construction. Reagan officially imposed sanctions in
January 1982, beginning with all U.S. companies involved with the pipeline’s construction to “all
Western firms under license from U.S. companies” 44 selling pipeline equipment. Sanctions were
defended in the United States’ government because of the martial law then being declared in
Poland by Poland’s communist leader, in response to disorder and protests led by the Polish labor
union, Solidarity. Reagan’s Secretary of Defense, Caspar Weinberger, wrote, following the first
round of sanctions, “the events in Poland have created our best opportunity for derailing the West
Siberia to Western European national gas pipeline project.” 45
Despite sanction support in the United States, the sanctions caused a significant rift in the
transatlantic relationship. To many Europeans, U.S. sanctions symbolized the U.S. attempt to
“dictate the actions of foreign corporations and foreign governments.” 46 The United States’ closest
European ally at the time, Great Britain, expressed the most displeasure at the sanctions with Prime
Minister Margaret Thatcher regarding them as America acting “extraterritorially”, 47 attempting to
impose its law on European allies. Thatcher addressed the House of Commons in July 1982, “The
question is whether one very powerful nation can prevent existing contracts being fulfilled; I think
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it is wrong to do that.”48 Some in the U.S. agreed with America’s European allies, like former
Undersecretary of State in the Kennedy and Johnson Administrations, George W. Ball. In a 1982
statement to the New York Times, Ball wrote, “The Reagan Administration’s frenetic efforts to
obstruct the building of the Soviet-European natural-gas pipeline are marked by hypocrisy, selfdeception and an astonishing ignorance of past experience.” 49 Ball also added how sanctions were
at best, a “marginal nuisance,” and would have had a smaller effect than desired on a country with
an economy as large as the Soviet Union’s. 50
As the rift between the United States and Western Europe deepened, former Secretary of
State Al Haig concluded, “a U.S. campaign against the pipeline might well do more to split the
alliance than impede construction.” 51 Even though the Reagan Administration understood the
importance of levying pressure on the Soviet Union’s economy, Reagan’s Secretary of Commerce
Malcolm Baldridge noted that, “We want to be as tough as we can, operating in the real world. If
we go too far and can’t get our Allies to go with us, it won’t work … We cannot stop all these
countries from shipping to the USSR.”52 Despite these statements, Reagan remained committed to
his hardline foreign policy and was only persuaded to reverse his thinking when George Shultz
replaced Haig as Secretary of State, and argued, “instead of inhibiting a common enemy, these
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sanctions created a new and formidable barrier to other objectives of the U.S.-European
alliance.”53 As a result of Shultz’s persuasion, consistent pushback from U.S. allies, and a tense
transatlantic relationship, Reagan withdrew sanctions in November 1982. The U.S. dropped its
offensive position, allowing the completion of the Siberian gas pipeline, but in return for
America’s European allies agreeing to a series of non-binding measures. The measures included
an agreement not to “contribute to the military or strategic advantage of the USSR.” 54 The series
of non-binding measures were extremely vague, and arguably, the Siberian pipeline project
symbolized a breach in the agreement. Nevertheless, by 1984, the pipeline completed 3,000 miles,
delivering natural gas from the Soviet Union to Europe.55 In addition to representing the successes
of Europe and the Soviet Union over U.S. sanctions, the Siberian pipeline set the Soviet Union on
the path to expanding and modernizing its gas industry, for the purpose of constructing additional
pipelines from its territory directly to the country(ies) of export.
The 1982 Siberian pipeline was significant for three reasons. First, the pipeline was a
physical representation of the “pipes for gas” relationship between Europe and the Soviet Union.
Second, it exemplified the division between Western Europe and the United States in their foreign
policy approach to the Soviet Union. While Western Europe viewed the pipeline as an opportunity
to alleviate tensions and create a mutually beneficial relationship between the Soviet Union and
Europe, the United States viewed the pipeline as the first stake in European energy security and
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the beginning of an ever-increasing European dependence on Soviet energy. Third, the pipeline
was the physical representation of successful application of Brandt’s Ostpolitik. Brandt believed
bilateral relations based on economic cooperation and strategic dialogue had the potential to
positively influence and stabilize geopolitics between the East and West. Therefore, from the
perspective of Ostpolitik, the 1982 Siberian pipeline was tasked with delivering energy to Western
Europe while simultaneously strengthening relations between Western Europe and the Soviet
Union. Ostpolitik was eventually revered across the Atlantic, when former U.S. Secretary of State
Henry Kissinger wrote in the final volume of his memoirs that “human contacts á la Ostpolitik”
secured the downfall of communism in Eastern Europe and not Kissinger’s strategy of
“transformation from above through increased sovereignty for the East European communist
states.”56
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Figure 2 – Map Route of the 1982 Siberian Pipeline
Source: Strategic Studies, 1985
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3.3. Case Study 2 – The 2012 Original Nord Stream Pipeline
3.3.1. The Reapplication of Ostpolitik
The original Nord Stream pipeline has operated since 2012, becoming the longest subsea
pipeline in the world, measuring 1,224 kilometers, and delivering 55 bcm of LNG from the Russian
port of Narva Bay to the German town of Greifswald. Discussion for a “joint declaration of intent”
between the German and Russian governments in 1990 set the stage for the original Nord Stream
pipeline.57 The initial planning phase began in 2006, with the start of construction beginning in
2010.58
Despite thirty years of change on the global stage, most significantly Germany’s
reunification in November 1989, the objectives for constructing the Nord Stream pipeline are
similar to Western Europe’s objectives for constructing the 1982 Siberian pipeline. Specifically,
Germany’s agreement in constructing another Russian controlled pipeline resulted from Germany
maintaining its Cold War notions and foreign policy of Ostpolitik and Europe’s increasing need
for reliable energy exports. For example, Germany still believed in the idea of alleviating tensions
between the East and West or bringing Russia closer to the West through economic projects that
were beneficial both to Europe and Russia. Germany seemed confident with bringing Russia closer
to the West, since the Soviet Union had collapsed in 1990 and Germany’s reunification was
“allowed” in 1989 by Russian President Mikhail Gorbachev. 59 Also, Europe needed gas. European

57

Ben Knight. “The History of Nord Stream.” Deutsche Welle (DW). July 23, 2021. https://www.dw.com/en/thehistory-of-nord-stream/a-58618313.
58
59

Nord Stream. “Planning the Nord Stream Pipelines.” https://www.nord-stream.com/the-project/planning/

This is a German misconception, stated by President of the German Association for East European Studies,
Ruprecht Polenz. Polenz argues that most Germans credit Gorbachev for Germany’s reunification when more credit
was due to U.S. Presidents Reagan and George H.W. Bush.

38
imports of Russian energy peaked in 2005, 60 most likely serving as the catalyst for the pipeline’s
initial planning phase in 2006. Specifically, since 2000, the EU has annually imported between
118-138 million tonnes of Russian energy, equivalent to over 88 billion gallons of Russian crude
oil.61 One factor which led to an increase in EU energy imports was the increase in reliability of
gas exports due to technological innovations in pipeline infrastructure that allowed Russia and
Nord Stream to omit the need for all gas transit states. These technological innovations in the
global gas market, specifically through subsea pipelines, expanded the exporting capabilities of
natural gas. As the leading European pioneer for the environment, Germany welcomed the Nord
Stream pipeline not only for its reliability and efficiency in energy transport but also for its export
of the “greener fuel” that produces less carbon dioxide than crude oil.
Most significantly, like the Siberian pipeline, the Nord Stream pipeline was to provide for Europe’s
energy needs with reliable exports of gas while also strengthening the relationship of
interdependence between Russia and Europe and specifically, Russia and Germany. To the
Western Europeans nostalgic for the past successes of Ostpolitik, they were presented with an
opportunity to not only reminisce about the Cold War “east policy” but also re-apply it through
the first Nord Stream pipeline.
3.3.2. The Construction of the 2012 Nord Stream Pipeline
The pipeline was built and remains in operation by Nord Stream AG, an international
consortium of five major companies based in Zug, Switzerland. The five major companies include
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the Russian monopoly gas company, Gazprom, with 51 percent of shareholdings, followed by
Germany’s Wintershall DEA (15.5%), Europe’s E.ON (15.5%), Netherland’s Gasunie (9%) and
the international ENGIE (9%). 62 Nord Stream AG states online that the “combined experience of
these companies ensures the best technology, safety and corporate governance for the Nord Stream
project, which aims to provide a secure energy supply for Europe.”63 The pipeline’s “secure energy
supply for Europe” includes exports of up to 55 bcm of natural gas per year, for at least 50 years.
According to data released by Nord Stream AG, 7.4 billion euros was invested in the pipeline’s
construction. Nord Stream AG also highlights online the contributions Nord Stream makes to
Europe and the environment by stating that the pipeline costs nothing to European taxpayers, 12
countries received business and employment from Nord Stream’s investments, and the pipeline is
a “safe and environmentally responsible way of transporting gas” due to the 200,000 tons saving
of carbon dioxide.64
3.3.3. Nord Stream: Through an American Lens
Despite Nord Stream AG positively marketing the pipeline and its detailed contributions
to Europe’s economy and energy security, the U.S. remained staunchly opposed to the project.
Like its view of the 1982 Siberian pipeline, the U.S. government believed Nord Stream was a
Kremlin strategy to exploit EU solidarity, European energy security, and undermine the
transatlantic relationship through the weaponization of Russian gas exports. Despite stark
opposition from the Bush Administration, the project was still in its planning phase by the end of
George Bush’s second term, presenting few opportunities for aggressive action. Construction
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began during President Barack Obama’s first term, but his “reset” strategy with Moscow, and shift
in the U.S. position on the pipeline, allowed for a smoother operation of construction. Richard
Morningstar, former U.S. special envoy for Eurasian energy stated in an interview, “We [U.S.]
don’t want to have a highly politicized, ‘us vs. them’ discussion with the Russians. We want to
engage with Russia constructively. They are and will continue to be an important player in world
energy markets.”65 Gazprom’s former deputy chief executive, Medvedev welcomed this shift, and
stated the “new administration is much more constructive.”66 Even though the Obama
Administration remained opposed to the project, the administration agreed it was wiser to expand
Europe’s energy markets through a southern corridor that circumvents Russia, than fight the Nord
Stream pipeline project to the point of eliminating the possibility of a reset with Moscow.
3.3.4. Nord Stream: Through a German Lens
Former German Chancellor Gerhard Schröder consistently remained a supporter of the
2012 Nord Stream pipeline, so much so that upon his loss for re-election in 2006, Schröder joined
the Nord Stream’s board of directors. Upon her entry into the chancellorship, many assumed
Angela Merkel would withdraw Germany’s support for the project because of her criticism for
Schröder’s “intermixing of roles”, transitioning from chancellor to Nord Stream AG’s board
member. More significantly, however, because of her childhood in East Germany, Merkel has
maintained a cautious approach towards Russia. Despite these claims, upon her first meeting with
former Russian President Medvedev, Merkel reinforced Germany’s support for the pipeline,
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claiming it was “strategically important for the whole of Europe.” 67 Research showed Merkel’s
strict differentiation between politics and economic trade enabled the Nord Stream pipeline to
reach completion.68 Sources referred to the pipeline as one born from friendship. 69 This was likely
referencing the friendship between Schröder and Putin, which was solidified upon Schröder’s
accession to chairman of the shareholder’s committee for Nord Stream AG, president of the board
of directors at Nord Stream AG, and most recently, his February 2022 nomination to join the
supervisory board of Gazprom. 70
Through the German lens, Nord Stream was viewed as a modern policy of Willy Brandt’s
Ostpolitik, in that the pipeline would keep Europe and Russia linked in a sustainable and reliable
relationship of interdependence for decades to come. In a 2006 interview, Russian President
Vladimir Putin addressed this relationship of interdependence in the following statement, “When
we have a common pipeline system, we are equally dependent on each other.” 71 This idea of mutual
benefit and engagement for peaceful coexistence through trade has been a popular German
argument for its support of Nord Stream. Even though the Obama Administration’s reset strategy
with Moscow allowed for pipeline construction without impediment, Schröder’s and Merkel’s
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determination and the resurgent policies of Ostpolitik significantly contributed to the successful
campaign for the original Nord Stream pipeline.
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Figure 3 – Map Route of the 2012 Nord Stream Pipeline
Source: Bendik Solum Whist, 2008
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3.3.5. Past Successes of the EU-Russian Relationship of Interdependence
Interdependence creates complex situations where states enter into a balancing act of
seeking benefits from international exchange while simultaneously maintaining as much autonomy
and security as possible. The relationship of interdependence created between the EU and the
Soviet Union through the 1982 Siberian pipeline and strengthened through the 2012 original Nord
Stream pipeline were examples of a balanced or stable relationship of interdependence. The
relationship of interdependence was stable because according to Casier, 2011 and the theory of
interdependence, Europe and the Soviet Union/Russia had as much to gain and lose from the
relationship of interdependence portrayed through the Siberian and Nord Stream pipelines. In other
words, the costs of disrupting or damaging the relationship of interdependence would be greater
than the risks associated with maintaining the relationship.
The theory of interdependence functioned the best for both Europe and the Soviet Union
during the Cold War. Even during the most tense times, gas continued to flow. Despite a divided
Germany, Western Germany agreed to a “gas for pipes” relationship; Germany supplied the Soviet
Union with German engineered pipeline equipment in return for Soviet gas. Other European
governments supported the “gas for pipes” agenda, deeming them “vital state missions,” 72
especially considering Soviet gas was cheap and closer to Europe than alternative exporters.
Most significantly, the theory of interdependence functioned well enough during the Cold
War to successfully establish the 1982 Siberian pipeline as a physical representation of the
interdependencies of the two regions as well as a success of Ostpolitik or a component of Western
engagement with Russia through trade. The interdependence model faced new challenges
following the end of the Cold War and the emergence of a competing narrative centered around
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energy security. In other words, by the time the original Nord Stream pipeline was being
constructed, Ostpolitik was becoming outdated and the interdependence model was less effective
in explaining the evolving EU-Russian relationship of the 21st century. Due to occurrences in
European geopolitics and the increasing importance of trust in the EU-Russian relationship of
interdependence, the construction of the original Nord Stream pipeline faced new challenges that
made it difficult to re-apply Ostpolitik. Because of these modern challenges, the 1982 Siberian
pipeline has become the stronger and successful physical representation of Ostpolitik and the
interdependence model than the 2012 Nord Stream pipeline.
3.3.6. Trust in the EU-Russian Relationship of Interdependence
Concerns regarding the gas relationship emerged following changes and breakthroughs in
gas producing and exporting technology, as well as the global awareness of environmental threats,
and geopolitical strife. Specifically, the development of reverse-flow technologies, data
demonstrating a significant increase in the Earth’s temperature, multiple oil shocks, and Russia’s
invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 influenced Western Europe to both buttress and expand its energy
security to include more energy suppliers and sources of renewable energy. The EU needed a
uniform energy policy, one to extract Europe from its interdependent relationship with Russia.
By the 21st century, the concept of trust began to saturate discussion on EU energy policy,
as well as the difficulties in establishing a uniform policy because of the differing levels of trust
among member states with Russia. The two went hand in hand; the difficulties in establishing a
uniform EU approach to Russia prevented the possibility of adopting a uniform EU energy policy.
As Ziegler argued in his analysis of trust, “variations in trust impact the EU’s ability to make
effective energy policy, erode foreign policy coherence, and generate strains within the European
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community.”73 As a reminder, Ziegler’s definition of trust is “one’s willingness to place one’s
interests under the control of others in a particular context, on the assumption that the trustee will
not exploit the truster’s vulnerability.” 74 In the realm of energy policy and bilateral energy
relations, trust plays an important role to the extent that a trustworthy gas relationship could
eliminate the possibility of the relationship becoming an energy security issue.
A “trustful” relationship rarely remains stagnant because levels of trust can vary depending
on the changes in a country’s foreign policy or most significantly, its leadership. This is especially
applicable to Russia by the 21st century when Vladimir Putin entered the Kremlin. Russia’s
offensive position in Chechnya from 1999-2000, the 2008 invasion of Georgia, 2014 annexation
of Crimea, and the 2020 poisoning and imprisonment of political opposition leader Navalny, are a
few of the many examples of Putin’s declaration of Russian values that go against the Western
rule of law. The Western rule of law has its roots in the 1949 establishment of the Geneva
Conventions, creation of NATO, the 1957 Treaty of Rome and the creation of the European
Economic Community (EEC), to name a few. As new global orders emerged, western governments
continued to lead and implement laws that were within the 20th century international governmental
framework. Rather than join and follow the West’s lead, Putin approached the purpose of law
differently, specifically, “rather than seeing the law as a limit to power politics, he [Putin] sees it
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as a tool, and is skilled at invoking legal and technical excuses in order to put pressure on other
countries.”75
Since the steady expansion of NATO in 2000, Putin’s paranoia with the West and nostalgia
for the empire of the Soviet Union has dictated Russian foreign policy. Even though Putin’s lack
of diplomacy and aggressive acts of foreign policy led to a decrease in the West’s trust of Russia,
and specifically, the decline in the West’s trust of Russia as a reliable gas partner, the
interdependence between the two regions remained. The interdependence remained because of the
consistent and significant vulnerabilities and ideologies which solidified the decades-long EURussia relationship of interdependence. Vulnerabilities included Europe’s dependence on Russian
energy and the Russian economy’s dependence on European consumers while ideologies referred
to Europe’s strong belief in their bargaining power over Russia, and the memory of the successful
Ostpolitik inspired, Europe-Soviet gas relationship that enabled the creation and operation of the
first EU-Soviet pipeline.
Despite the past successes of the EU-Soviet gas relationship, the fractured EU approach to
Russia has been portrayed throughout significant scholarly research, best portrayed in a 2007
European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR) report. The report stated Europe squanders its
greatest source of leverage against Russia: its unity.76 This disunion of the EU was a result of
mixed approaches to Russia and how Russia exploits the mixed EU approaches to its advantage.
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ECFR identifies five factions 77 of the EU that challenged its ability to form a cohesive EU energy
policy. Those factions are:
1. “Trojan Horses” refer to Cyprus 78 and Greece and their defense of Russia, exercised
within the EU system. Even though Greece has become less of a “trojan horse,” 79
Cyprus and Greece rely heavily on Russian energy imports. For example, Cyprus’
dependency rate, or “the extent to which an economy relies upon imports in order to
meet its energy needs” measured over 90 percent with Greece not far behind at
approximately 75 percent. 80 As the largest European exporter of energy, always keen
to secure European consumers, Russia gladly provided for the energy needs of both
Cyprus and Greece.
2. “Strategic Partners” refer to France, Germany, Italy and Spain or the EU countries who
maintain the notions of Ostpolitik, or the idea that engagement with Russia through
trade will lead to stronger and more stable EU-Russia relations. The approaches of
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France, Germany, Italy, and Spain make them vulnerable to Kremlin operations that
seek to undermine the unity and strength of the West through operations disguised as
economic projects.
3. “Friendly Pragmatists” refer to Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Finland, Hungary,
Luxembourg, Malta, Portugal, Slovakia, and Slovenia or those who maintain ties with
Russia but place business before politics. These states’ prioritization of business over
politics gives the Kremlin some leverage in influencing EU politics.
4. “Frosty Pragmatists” refer to the Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Ireland, Latvia,
the Netherlands, Romania, Sweden, and the United Kingdom. 81 Similar to the
“Friendly Pragmatists”, these countries choose to maintain business ties with Russia
but are more aggressive than their “friendly pragmatists” in responding to Russia’s
violations in humanitarian issues. In this case, the Kremlin has less leverage, especially
when Russia maintains its notorious repudiation in human rights violations.
5. “New Cold Warriors” refer to Lithuania and Poland or the countries which consistently
demonstrate their hostility towards Russia by exercising their veto to block EU
negotiations with Russia. Since Russia has little to zero leverage in Lithuania and
Poland, Russia’s strategic interests are best met through foreign policy initiatives that
circumvent the two EU states or better still, isolate the states from other EU member
states that maintain some sort of ties, whether political or business, with Russia.
3.3.7. Fractures in the EU-Russian Relationship of Interdependence
With the turn of the 21 st century, the EU-Russian gas relationship and specifically, the
German-Russian gas relationship, encountered obstacles that threatened to weaken the or
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destabilize the relationship of interdependence. Obstacles included the introduction of EU energy
legislation, Germany’s response to its emerging role as a major player and leader in the EU, and
disagreements in the EU gas market.
In 2009, the EU introduced the Third Energy Package to “improve the functioning of the
internal energy market and resolving certain structural problems.” 82 Key features of the Third
Energy Package include unbundling, or the separation of energy supply and operation ownership;
more independent regulators, acting as overseers in the competitive market; and attention towards
maintaining cross-border cooperation and open and fair retail markets for the benefit of European
energy consumers. 83 Aimed at enhancing EU energy security, the package also limited some
individual European states’ power, like the German government’s ability to maintain its
“containment and cooperation”84 motto with Russia.
Additional factors which thwarted the German-Russian gas relationship include the EU’s
increasingly guarded approach and critical view of EU member states' trade with Russian gas,
especially following the Russian-Ukrainian gas disputes in 2006 and 2009, 85 and the RussianGeorgian war in 2008.
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Within the new EU environment centered on energy security, Germany found itself in the
middle, trying to include diverging EU member state opinions regarding Russia and form a bridge
between the EU and Russia. Maintaining a gas relationship while respecting the EU’s guarded
approach to Russia was especially difficult for Germany while it rose to become the leader of the
EU, following the United Kingdom’s decision to leave in 2016. According to a 2017 article
published by The Economist, “Germany has never accepted the mantle of European or global
leadership that so many would like to thrust upon it, especially when it comes to the politics of
energy.”86 Even though there are closer economic and societal relations between Germany and
Russia out of all the east-west relations due to Ostpolitik and its successes, seen through the 1982
Siberian pipeline and 2012 Nord Stream pipeline, the countries’ economic entanglement has not
resulted in a liberalization of Russian politics, as Ostpolitik intended to happen.
Despite Germany’s aid in modernizing Russia, especially through its billion dollar loans
for Russia to expand its armada of pipelines, Russia’s political environment remained foreign and
dangerous to the western liberal order. Some German political and societal leaders argued that
even though Ostpolitik was a successful and central part of West German foreign policy, its themes
are no longer applicable because they had not prevented Russia’s significant acts of aggressive
foreign policy and breaches in the modern liberal order and were therefore dangerous to maintain.
Aggressive acts of Russian foreign policy included Russia’s instigated violence in the Donbas and
Crimea in 2014; the destruction of MH17 in 2014,87 and the poisoning of Kremlin opposition
leader, Aleksei Navalny in 2018. Recognizing its danger, Dr. Sarah Kirchberger, the Department
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Manager of the Institute for Security at the Christian-Albrechts Universität zu Kiel, argues
Ostpolitik should not be used as a “fig leaf to cover over the complete lack of realism and strategy
in the face of a completely different current situation.”88 According to Rebecca Harms, former
member of the European Parliament, representing the Germans’ Green party, the German
governments never adjusted their strategies to Russia according to what the world was observing
under Putin.89 For example, despite Germany joining its allies in condemning Russia’s annexation
of Crimea, violence in the Donbas, and the poisoning of Navalny, Germany did not respond to
these incidents with the same disciplinary actions as its allies. Specifically, Germany was not as
combative. This failure to go beyond words and maintaining its commitment to economic projects
with Russia have contributed to Russia’s ability to continually yield political and military pressure
in Europe, especially in Ukraine.
Germany’s failure to establish a strategic approach towards Russia because of its past
successes of Ostpolitik and recognize the signs that Russia does not seek a relationship but a
confrontation with the West, 90 frustrated Germany’s allies. Germany’s complex historical
relationship with Russia has heavily influenced its foreign policy, not only with Russia, but as a
leader of the EU and a NATO country. What others viewed as Germany’s misconceptions of
Russia, Germany viewed as key objectives of West Germany’s successful notions of Ostpolitik.
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Even though Germany’s failure to establish a strategic approach towards Russia was
dangerous for European solidarity, it was a benefit for Russian foreign policy because the Kremlin
excels on confusion and disagreement within the EU. For example, expert on German-Russian
relations, Angela Stent, describes Russian foreign policy as multifaceted, that the Kremlin may
claim it seeks stability but in reality, “Russian foreign policy toward the West is evidently designed
not to be predictable.”91 Germany’s one sided approach to Russia isolated Germany from and
threatened the solidarity of the EU. Germany’s continued stubbornness in believing a Russian
approach based on dialogue and economic cooperation, leads to stronger relations and
subsequently, a safer geopolitical environment, allowed discussions for another pipeline. Even
more surprising considering Germany’s and former Chancellor Merkel’s strong condemnation of
the annexation of Crimea in 2014, an agreement was reached between Germany and Russia for a
second line, running parallel to the original Nord Stream pipeline a year later, in 2015. The
declaration of intent for a twin pipeline forced the West’s frustration with Germany’s approach to
Russia to reach its peak. As will be analyzed and demonstrated in the subsequent section, the Nord
Stream 2 pipeline has become the physical representation of the decades-long solidification of the
interdependent German-Russian relationship. The historically engrained interdependence between
Germany and Russia persuaded Germany to allow the Kremlin to deploy its greatest foreign policy
asset – energy – through the construction of another Russian-operated pipeline.
In 1946, Winston Churchill spoke of an iron curtain, which threatened to envelop the West in the
Soviet Union’s red cloak of communism, capitulating the West into a fierce offensive position
against the Soviet Union. Under Vladimir Putin and his Machiavellian approach to energy
relations and foreign policy, the Russian Federation heaved Germany, Western and Eastern
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Europe, and the United States into a cataclysmic disagreement over the eleven billion euro
construction of the massive Russian pipeline, Nord Stream 2, and its distribution of liquified
natural gas (LNG). Despite decades of withstanding and assisting European countries in the push
against the iron curtain of the Cold War, through Nord Stream 2, Germany has assisted Russia in
re-drawing the gas curtain, while threatening the transatlantic alliance and Europe energy security,
and partitioning Europe in its wake.
3.4. Case Study 3 – The Nord Stream 2 Pipeline
3.4.1. Introduction
Nord Stream 2 gained significant attention since its inception in 2015 because of the
massive global debate regarding its proposed intentions and implications for EU-Russian relations
and EU energy security. The creators and strongest supporters of the pipeline, Germany and
Russia, viewed the project as a necessary and strategically economic commercial venture,
equipping Europe with a fundamental amount of needed LNG and subsequently, enhancing
European energy security. The leading parties of the German government coalitions from 20052022, the Christian Democratic Union (CDU) and the Social Democrat Party (SPD), remained
steadfast in support of the project, despite strong concern from EU member states and strong
opposition from their longtime transatlantic ally, the United States. The main reason for Germany’s
support of the Nord Stream 2 pipeline was not new, but stems from Germany’s past support for
the 1982 Siberian pipeline and 2012 original Nord Stream pipeline. The successes of these
pipelines’ operation and their various representations of Ostpolitik constituted Germany’s support
for Nord Stream 2. But Germany’s reapplication of Ostpolitik to West-Russian relations in the 21st
century was viewed by many in Europe and in the United States as a detrimental failure in German
foreign policy. According to many in Europe and the United States, the times in which to practice
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Ostpolitik had expired or the environment in which to apply the Cold War policy is no more, due
to the resurgence of or a drastic increase in Russian aggression on the global stage. These changes
in the geopolitical environment and the challenges which emerged, centered around energy
security in global political dialogue, were introduced during the proposition for and construction
of the original Nord Stream pipeline. Remaining unsolved and becoming more critical, these
challenges resurfaced following the proposition for the Nord Stream 2 pipeline.
This section encompasses the analysis of how we debate Nord Stream 2 and what the
pipeline means for European security, U.S. transatlantic relations, U.S.-German relations, and
relations within the EU by analyzing the disunited EU and transatlantic approaches to Nord Stream
2. Re-applying the template provided by Hayes and Victor, 2004, this section begins with an
overview of the European gas market in the 21st century in order to provide the foundation for
understanding how the inception and completion of Nord Stream 2 occurred. After defining the
terms and institutions related to the global gas market, the section then transitions to the analysis
of the Russian point of view on Nord Stream 2 and how energy is ingrained as a key element of
Russian foreign policy. Following an analysis of the pipeline’s strongest supporters, Russia and
Germany, the analysis transitions to the opposition to Nord Stream 2, and specifically, the Green
Party of the German coalition government, the United States as demonstrated by the Trump and
Biden Administrations, the European Commission of the EU, and Ukraine.
This section closes with a two part analysis on Nord Stream 2 from 2019 to 2022. The
analysis begins with the steps the United States and Europe took to prepare for the certification
and operation of Nord Stream 2 from 2019 to 2022, and specifically, the compromises made for
Ukraine, who was considered by Europe and the United States to be the most vulnerable to the
operation of Nord Stream 2. The final analysis closes with a critique of interdependence theory
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considering the theory fails to explain the pipeline’s cancellation and subsequently, the eradication
of the historical but fractured relationship of interdependence between the EU and Russia and
specifically, Germany and Russia. The 2019-2022 scope was chosen as the timeframe for the
section’s two part closing analysis because it includes compelling state policy responses to the
pipeline’s completion from the United States, Russia, and Germany, and includes three significant
milestones for the pipeline. Specifically, the completion of the pipeline’s construction in
September 2021, the pipeline’s strenuous certification process from September to November 2021,
and the pipeline’s cancellation in February 2022.
3.4.2. The Re-emergence of Energy Security in the European Gas Market
Until recently, global governments discussed energy from an economic perspective; energy
was not tied to politics or a state’s foreign policy. With the onset of the 21 st century, key events
shifted the energy discourse into the political dialogue. Specifically, with the increasing global
demand of energy, states became more focused on securing reliable energy as a means of
strengthening national security. The 2006 and 2009 gas crisis resulted from disagreements over
pricing and payments between Russia and Ukraine. In 2006, Ukraine refused to pay over $80 per
thousand cubic meters 92 (/mcm). After rejecting Gazprom’s hard stance on a price of $230/mcm,
on January 1, 2006, supplies to Ukraine were cut off, immediately affecting European consumers. 93
The same disagreement, but with stronger backlash, occurred on January 1, 2009. Unable to reach
a price agreement for Russian gas supply to Ukraine, supplies were cut off, resulting in a complete
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cut of supplies in 16 EU member states and Moldova by January 7. 94 The effects of the cut-off
were strongest in the Balkan states, where the population experienced a humanitarian emergency
because of the inability to heat their homes. 95 The 2006 and 2009 gas crisis portrayed Russia as an
unreliable supplier. The effects of the incidents of 1973, 2006, and 2009 on the EU-Russian gas
relationship threw the concept of energy security into the forefront of EU foreign policy, as stated
by former German Foreign Minister Steinmeier, “alliances and counter-alliances based on energy
issues are gathering their own dangerous momentum. A collision between the global thirst for
resources and world public policy is increasingly likely.” 96 As Nataliya Esakova, author of
European Energy Security: Analysing the EU-Russia Energy Security Regime in Terms of
Interdependence Theory states, “energy security is strongly linked to politics, as the ability of a
state to access energy supplies influences its national security” and “all market players benefit
from action to safeguard energy security, whether or not they have contributed to it.”97 As the gas
giant of Europe, Russia seemed to have the advantage in dictating energy policy on the continent.
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Therefore, by the 21st century, the EU took steps to secure its energy security against Russian
dictated energy policy through its multiple strategic energy reviews and security strategies.
The Green Paper of 2000, the Strategic Energy Reviews of 2008 and the 2009 European
Security Strategy are a few examples of the EU recognizing the importance of energy security and
the need for an active and uniform EU energy policy. All reports highlight Europe’s “external
dependence” on Russia for energy as a vulnerability.98 But the EU’s dependency on Russian gas
is so great that the EU has been unsuccessful in developing alternative suppliers that could match
the level of Russian gas exports. According to the EU’s 2000 Green Paper and due to the lack of
viable alternatives to Russian gas exports, it was decided that Europe’s energy security will not be
strengthened by maximizing self-sufficiency or minimizing dependence on Russia but by
minimizing the risks associated with said dependence. 99 To the disadvantage of the Russian
economy, Europe has options to minimize the risks associated with its dependence on Russian
energy. The options were relayed countless times in the media and academia, and called for a
stronger diversification of energy suppliers and a significant increase in renewable energy. Even
though these options would not eliminate Europe’s need for Russian energy, they would decrease
the level of exports, thereby decreasing the risks associated with relying heavily on Russian
energy.
3.4.3. Gazprom and Russian Gas Capabilities
Gas pipelines are one example of the technological innovations in the global gas economy
that added a new layer of complexity to the concept of energy security. Even though the emergence
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of pipeline technology allows for faster and more efficient transport of gas, pipelines create greater
levels of interdependence between countries because they are more expensive and less flexible
than traditional oil tankers. These levels of interdependence dictate how pipeline routes are created
– in terms of states’ geopolitical and strategic interests.100 Therefore, because of the high financial
and time cost for constructing pipelines, buyers and sellers are expected to be locked under contract
in order to receive the minimum return for investing in a billion dollar infrastructure project. This
was the understanding of the Russian gas monopoly, Gazprom, which holds a 51 percent share and
was in charge of leading the Nord Stream 2 pipeline.
The Public Joint Stock Company Gazprom (Gazprom) reigned as Russia’s dominant gas
exporter, accounting for 12 percent of global gas output and 68 percent of domestic gas
production.101 Gazprom owned most of the world’s gas pipelines by length, accounting for 103,212
km (64,133 miles).102 In addition to owning most of the world’s gas pipelines, Gazprom has direct
shares in sixteen European gas providers. 103 Gazprom presented itself online as a “model of
efficiency” in regards to utilizing green technology, resulting in the “lowest carbon footprint
among oil and gas majors.”104 Furthermore, Gazprom’s strategy is to “strengthen its leading
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position among global energy companies by diversifying sales markets, ensuring energy security
and sustainable development, improving efficiency and fulfilling its scientific and technical
potential.”105
Gazprom was not only powerful for its monopolistic hold over the Russian and European
gas supply but also for its close ties with Germany through business alliances and partnerships.
For example, former German Chancellor, Gerhard Schröder, had been a strong supporter of
German-Russian gas relations, demonstrated by his current position as chairman of Nord Stream
AG, the independent consortium for construction and operation of the Nord Stream pipeline, based
in Zug, Switzerland.
In addition to close relations with Germany’s leaders, Gazprom protected its shares in Nord
Stream 2 through alliances and offering shares of the Nord Stream 2 pipeline with some of
Europe’s largest energy companies: Wintershall (Germany), Engie (France), OMV (Austria), and
Shell (Netherlands). As early as 1990, Gazprom and Wintershall created a “partnership between
equals”, or specifically, a long-term agreement for marketing Russian natural gas in Germany. The
1990 agreement set the foundation for ambitious pipeline projects and joint ventures for more
Russian energy production. 106 Gazprom intertwining itself with Europe’s major gas companies
gives Gazprom an “instrument for manipulating the gas market in Europe” 107 while creating a
relationship of interdependence that added an extra layer of security to Gazprom’s investments in
Europe.
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Pipeline

Purpose

Date

Siberian Gas Pipeline

The first pipeline delivering natural gas from the Soviet Union to
Western Europe

1984

Minsk-Vilnius-KaunasKaliningrad

Pipeline delivering to consumers in Russia’s Kaliningrad region

1985

Blue Stream

Pipeline delivering Russian natural gas to Turkey across the Black
Sea

2003

The Northern Tyumen
Region (SRTO)-Torzhok

Gas trunkline delivering gas from Western Siberia to the town of
Torzhok

2006

The Dzhubga Lazarevskoye - Sochi

First Russian offshore pipeline delivering to the resort area on the
Caucasian coast of the Black Sea

2011

Gryazovets - Vyborg

Gas trunkline delivering gas to consumers in northwestern Russia
and the first Nord Stream export pipeline

2011

Nord Stream

Subsea pipeline exporting gas from Russia to Europe across the
Baltic Sea

2011

Sakhalin - Khabarovsk Vladivostok

The first interregional gas transmission system in eastern Russia,
delivering gas to consumers in the Khabarovsk and Primorye
Territories and supplying gas to the Asia-Pacific

2011

Bovanenkovo - Ukhta

Gas trunklines delivering gas from the Yamal Peninsula into
Russia’s Unified Gas Supply System

2012

Bovanenkovo - Ukhta 2
Ukhta – Torzhok

2017
Gas trunklines delivering additional gas to northwest Russia for
consumers and export purposes

Ukhta - Torzhok 2

2012
2018

Pochinki - Gryazovets

Gas pipeline serving as an interconnector between the central and
northern gas transmission corridors of Russia’s Unified Gas
Supply System, providing gas supplies to Russia’s northwest and
central regions.

Power of Siberia

Gas trunkline supplying gas from the Chayandinskoye field to 2019
domestic consumers in eastern Russia and China. Supplies from an
additional gas field will be added in late 2022.

TurkStream

Gas pipeline stretching from Russia to Turkey across the Black
Sea. First of the pipeline’s two strings intended for Turkish
consumers; second string delivers gas to southern and southeastern
Europe

Figure 4 – Gazprom Controlled Pipelines and Developments in the Russian Gas Industry
Source: Gazprom Website

2012

2020
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3.4.4. Nord Stream 2: Through a Russian Lens
Gas has remained a central component of Russia’s economy and survival throughout the
Cold War and since the collapse of the Soviet Union. In 2020, Russia was the second-largest
producer of dry natural gas, producing an estimated 22.5 trillion cubic feet, 108 but ranked first in
leading exporter of gas, exporting 197.2 billion cubic meters (bcm) of gas in 2020 and 40.4 bcm
of LNG.109 From the outside, the Kremlin portrayed its views of energy as being in line with that
of the International Energy Agency (IEA) and the European Commission, specifically, as
“essential to economic growth and human development.” 110 As the leading exporter of gas, Russia
had the ability to contribute to economic growth and human development by creating bilateral
relationships with energy seeking states. As Gazprom’s Deputy Chairman of the Management
Committee, Alexander Medvedev argued, “the interdependence [between energy producers and
consumers] is the guarantee of a strong commercial partnership and stable supply over the long
term.”111
From the inside, the Kremlin recognized the strategic importance of Russia’s gas producing
and exporting capabilities. The Kremlin utilized energy as a political tool in Russian foreign
policy. According to scholars, “on a daily basis, Russia’s energy network is the most constantly
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operating factor of coercion or of leverage in Eurasia.” 112 Additional analysis of Russian foreign
policy explained how it is conducted and “characterized by an ability to use the energy factor as a
tool of power and impact to promote and consolidate the Kremlin’s geopolitical interests in
Europe.”113 In this sense, Russian energy policy is Russian foreign policy. The two have merged
since Vladimir Putin became President, considering, “no European leaders have a level of
knowledge of energy policy and the energy business comparable to that of Putin.” 114
Not only are the successes of Russia’s energy market linked to Russia’s strategic foreign
policy objectives but were also linked to the successes of Russia’s economy and future economic
development. Therefore, the Kremlin constituted gas as an essential pillar of the Russian economy.
President Putin remained at the helm of maintaining Russia’s leading position as the largest global
exporter. According to energy expert Daniel Yergin, Putin “understands the power and influence
oil ignites and is strategic in capitalizing Russian energy while simultaneously capitalizing on other
countries’ weaknesses.”115 According to another energy expert, Dr. Angina Grigas, Nord Stream
2 is the most recent initiative of “Putin’s gas diplomacy” 116 or the Kremlin’s strategic objective to
establish relations with the west, through pipelines, to exploit internal weaknesses and spread
Russian influence.
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Additional sources of literature that portrayed Russian ambitions in the energy sector
include the 2009 Energy Strategy. The 2009 Energy Strategy, composed by the Russian Ministry
of Energy was relevant because the strategy extends to 2030, with a focus on developing Russia’s
energy infrastructure in order to minimize the negative effects of global events, like the 2008
financial crisis. The strategy was significant because the Russian government publicly recognized
the importance of fuel and energy as an influential foreign policy tool. 117 Specifically, the strategy
defined Russia’s main vectors of long-term development in the energy market and exporting
industry as 1) Begin the transition to innovative and energy-efficient development; 2) Change the
nation’s structure and scale of energy production; 3) Develop a competitive market environment
to counter competing energy exporters; and 4) Integrate Russia into the world energy system as a
means to gain respect and additional customers.118
Fulfilling the Russian Energy Strategy had not been easy, despite the monopolistic powers
of Gazprom. For example, in 2009 Gazprom projected an increase in European gas demand but
these expectations fell short when Europe’s energy policy sought to limit natural gas consumption.
Between 2010-2018, Europe’s natural gas consumption fell more than 10 percent. The drop only
worsened in 2019 when the European Union adopted the Green Deal, an energy policy aimed at
decreasing European dependence on fossil fuels and an increase in renewable energy sources.
Even though there was an increase in global LNG exporters, in addition to the United States
surpassing Russia in natural gas production in 2011, Putin was determined to mark Russia as the
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strongest and largest global exporter of LNG, 119 and one way of achieving this goal was through
the operation of another Russian owned and operated pipeline, Nord Stream 2. From the Russian
perspective, research in support of Nord Stream 2 included how the pipeline will create
approximately 31,000 full-time jobs, as well as increased competition for LNG, resulting in
reduced gas prices for European consumers, and as a cleaner fuel, LNG will support Europe’s
climate goals.120 In addition to these benefits, and from a business standpoint, exporting gas
through a direct pipeline from Russia to Western Europe is more economical because it eliminates
or significantly lessens the risk of disorder or disturbances from exporting via transit states.
Putin made clear Russia was capable of surpassing other gas exporters, demonstrated in his
March 2006 speech at the Meeting with the G8 Energy Ministers in Moscow (when Russia was
still a member of the G8). In addition to voicing Russian power in the energy sector, Putin added
how Russia makes a “considerable contribution to ensuring global and regional energy security”
as a “serious and responsible partner on the energy resources markets.” 121 Putin declared to the
global gas market his intentions to initiate “projects of strategic importance” with “energy
companies from other countries” in order to “ensure sustained optimization of global energy
supplies.122” If the empire of the Soviet Union cannot be reclaimed, Putin seeked to build his own
empire of Russian pipelines, fulfilling the strategic goals outlined in the 2009 Energy Strategy.
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3.4.5. Nord Stream 2: Through a German Lens
Germany had many arguments for its support of the Nord Stream 2 pipeline, but all
arguments originated around the fact that Germany needed a major energy supplier, considering
the country imports the most Russian gas out of all EU member states. For example, in the year
2021, 55 percent of Germany’s gas imports came from Russia, a clear portrayal of Germany’s
dependence on Russian gas imports.123
Another argument for Germany’s support of Nord Stream 2 correlated to Germany’s
Energiewende or the country’s transition to cleaner energy. Following the March 2011 nuclear
disaster at Fukushima, Japan, Germany’s energy transition expanded to include the shutdown of
all German nuclear plants and the elimination of nuclear energy as a national source of energy.
Nord Stream 2 would supply Germany with significant economic benefits, like lower energy prices
and larger energy supply, potentially allowing for the closing of all German coal mines and power
stations.124 Chairman of the German Eastern Business Association, Oliver Hermes summarized
the benefits of Nord Stream 2 into the following statement, “The pipeline will help ensure the
increasing demand for gas to the coal and nuclear phaseout. The pipeline has great potential to also
transport hydrogen and to further develop the decades-long, reliable energy partnership with
Russia into a climate partnership.”125 Many in the EU critique Germany for developing an energy
transition alone, without EU participation or cooperation. The EU also perceived Germany’s
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energy transition as lacking in strategic approach towards external energy relations. 126 Specifically,
“German experts and leaders have routinely framed Germany’s dependence on energy imports in
terms of mutual interdependence rather in terms of a problem or risk for national security.” 127
Germany lacked a strategic approach to energy relations because Germany does not view energy
as a sector or tool of German foreign policy, as demonstrated in Germany’s lack of a Ministry or
Minister/Advisor for Energy. Contrary to Russian, American, and the majority of European
attitudes towards energy, Germany viewed energy as a “commodity and a service” and should
therefore be separated from foreign policy objectives.128 In other words, through the development
of Nord Stream 2, Germany continued to discuss energy from an economic perspective, even when
energy security emerged in political discourse, thereby separating energy from German foreign
policy and national security. As the leader of the EU, Germany’s laissez-faire approach to energy
policy frustrated and drew concern from EU member states.
Despite Germany’s desired transition to a greener future, the most popular argument for
Germany’s support of Nord Stream 2 related to the ugly truth that Germany needed gas and as the
largest exporter of energy resources in Europe, Russia was the most economically logical partner
with which to establish gas relations. In addition, Germany viewed Russia as a reliable gas partner,
as analyst with the German Institute for International and Security Affairs Kirsten Westphal stated,
“Russia’s reliability [as an exporter of gas] remains a mantra for German energy policy.” 129 From
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Schröder to the sixteen-year chancellorship of Angela Merkel, the CDU and SPD viewed the
pipeline as an economically sound and necessary commercial venture with little ties to geopolitics
or an opportunity to expand Putin’s purse strings for additional acts of aggressive Russian foreign
policy. In 2017, Merkel rebuked the countless EU objections to the pipeline, stating EU institutions
have no business intruding in a purely commercial enterprise while her Foreign Minister, Sigmar
Gabriel bluntly stated, “Europe’s energy supply is Europe’s business.”130
Contrary to the majority of western opinion and harking back to Willy Brandt’s notion of
Ostpolitik, Germany believed Nord Stream 2 was an opportunity for the West to bring in Russia,
lessening Russia’s aggression and potentially influencing Russian society with western liberal
values, as energy expert Kirsten Westphal stated, “tying Russia into trade agreements will
moderate Russia’s behavior.”131 Through the complexity of energy policy, Germany has found
itself teetering in the middle of Russia and the EU, attempting to maintain a balancing act as a
leader of the EU and as a state in need of energy exports from the EU’s biggest threat, the Kremlin.
The difficulties of establishing a German energy policy is summarized in the following quote,
“There are three challenges for Germany energy policy: first: Russia, second, Russia, and third,
Russia again.”132
As a child of the Cold War and with greater understanding of Putin than any other European
leader because of her experiences living in a Soviet occupied space and Russian fluency, Angela
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Merkel was arguably the only buffer between the West and Russia, and believed Nord Stream 2
had the potential to be a physical connector between the two. According to a 2009 Georgetown
Journal of International Affairs article featuring women in power, in the first decade of the 21 st
century, Merkel was known as the “most effective mediator among three competing forces: the
United States, the European Union, and Russia.” 133 Merkel’s tenacity and mediator skills were
needed in order to demonstrate to the United States that it is possible to both support Nord Stream
2 as well as western institutions like the NATO and the transatlantic alliance. However, many in
the West viewed her position as dangerous and strictly pro-Russian. Her support for the pipeline
was surprising to some, since Merkel did not view the former German Democratic Republic and
the Soviet Empire with any great nostalgia, like her Russian counterpart Putin. Merkel dismissed
claims her support was dangerously benefitting Putin and the possibility of Russia utilizing the
pipeline as an energy weapon by stating Russia’s need for European money was greater than
Europe’s energy needs and this Russian need for payment will quell the Kremlin from utilizing
the pipeline as a weapon. In other words, Merkel recognized the Russian economy’s dependence
on European gas consumers and believed this Russian vulnerability would stabilize the GermanRussian relationship of interdependence by preventing the Kremlin from acting aggressively,
sending the relationship into a critical and crisis-driven state.
Merkel’s successor, Olaf Scholz, having taken office in December 2021, leads the current
German government coalition of the Social Democrats, Christian Democrats, and the Green Party.
With the exception of the Greens, the German coalition maintained the stance of their predecessor,
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labeling Nord Stream 2 as a “private-sector project”134 to ensure reliable gas supply for Germany’s
transition to cleaner energy. Scholz maintained the German argument that the pipeline is a
commercial project, considering the pipeline’s certification process began in September 2021, led
by a private, nonpolitical German agency. As the former German Finance Minister, Scholz also
condemned the application of U.S. sanctions on the project, and labeled them as a “severe
intervention in German and European internal affairs.”135
Only until recently, with the full scale Russian invasion of Ukraine on February 24, 2022,
has Scholz altered the German position on Nord Stream 2. But before the invasion, the German
coalition governments under Merkel and Scholz, vocally demonstrated their support for Ukraine’s
integrity, in addition to their support for Nord Stream 2. For example, in July 2021, Former German
Chancellor Merkel gave statements alongside Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenski regarding
her determination to help Ukraine remain a transit state following the completion of Nord Stream
2. Merkel said Germany takes the “big worries about this [Nord Stream 2] on the Ukrainian side
seriously,” and will do “everything we can” to allow Ukraine to continue its status as a transit state.
She added, “that’s what we promised Ukraine, and I keep my promises and I think any future
German chancellor will as well.” 136 One day after Gazprom announced its completion of Nord
Stream 2 on September 10, 2021, Chancellor Merkel reiterated her declaration to Moscow to help
Ukraine maintain its annual transit revenue in a joint press conference in Poland with Prime
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Minister Morawiecki, “I made clear that it is our concern that Ukraine will remain a transit land
for Russian gas.”137 Even sixteen days after Merkel’s meeting with Prime Minister Morawiecki,
as a candidate for the German chancellorship, Olaf Scholz said at a press conference that, “as
regards the pipeline that has been completed, it is important that everyone takes into consideration
the guarantees related to its operation. The guarantees state that Ukraine should remain a transit
country [...] This is a point we take very seriously.”138 Scholz maintained this position in a January
2022 statement that Ukraine “can rely on Germany” in its desire to remain a transit country. 139
Both Merkel and Scholz’s actions to assist Ukraine in maintaining its status as a transit state
exemplified the chancellors’ belief that the full operation of Nord Stream 2 could coincide with
the safeguard of Ukraine’s annual revenue and national sovereignty.
Within Germany’s government stands some opposition to Nord Stream 2: the Greens.
Germany’s current Foreign Minister, Annalena Baerbock, and leader of the Greens separated her
party from the traditional German approach to Russia. In other words, Baerbock called for a
tougher German approach to Russia that would withdraw Germany from the cautious approach
demonstrated throughout the sixteen-year tenure of Merkel. As Germany’s green party, the Greens
staunchly opposed the pipeline on environmental concerns. To the frustration of many
environmental groups both in Europe and the U.S., the focus on Nord Stream 2 had been entirely
geopolitical, while the pipeline’s environmental impacts were understated or even ignored. This
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was surprising considering traditionally, a “green mindset” prevailed in Germany when it came to
energy supply while “energy affordability” triumphed in other western countries like the United
States.140 German environmental groups such as Deutsche Umwelthilfe (DUH) and the
Naturschutzbund Deutschland (NABU) argued the pipeline was expected to emit at least 100
million tons of carbon dioxide annually, making the pipeline incompatible with Germany’s
emissions targets and its carbon budget approach. 141 This questioned how “clean” or how much of
a “transition fuel” to cleaner energy LNG really was. According to an in-depth analysis on EU
energy security, LNG is more polluting than pipeline gas because shipping and liquefaction
generate additional emissions. 142 Furthermore, environmental NGOs highlight how the pipeline’s
path tore through several onshore and offshore conservation areas like the Kurgalsky nature
reserve in Russia and five Natura 2000 sites in Germany.143 Finally, natural gas is a fossil fuel and
is therefore a limited resource and should not be prioritized over the reliability of renewable
energy.
Lastly, according to environmentalists and economists, another pipeline was unnecessary.
Rather than construct a twin pipeline through Nord Stream 2, Annalena Baerbock argued for
stronger investments in the modernization of the 2012 original Nord Stream pipeline, until the
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pipeline has the potential to transport non-fossil hydrogen gas.144 In addition, the German Institute
for Economic Research labeled Nord Stream 2 as “commercially inefficient” because the original
Nord Stream had the potential to supply Germany with 55 billion cubic meters of natural gas.
According to their analysis, 55 billion cubic meters is enough natural gas to sustain Sweden for 55
years.145 Considering how expensive pipelines are to construct and maintain, Nord Stream 2 would
need to remain in operation past 2045, forcing the EU to remain dependent on fossil fuels longer
than planned. Therefore, not only did Nord Stream 2 question the need for an increase in gas supply
but also the determination and legitimacy of Germany’s goal to become climate neutral by 2045 146
and lead the EU into a similar greener transition. Despite the Greens’ pledge to scrap the pipeline
in March 2021, the pipeline finished construction in September 2021. Throughout the last quarter
2021, the Greens shifted their attention to the German and EU certification process, hoping the
pipeline’s breach of EU law and specifically, unbundling of the EU’s Third Energy Package,
would prevent its operation.
Out of all of the global positions and perspectives on Nord Stream 2, Germany maintained
the most complex from the pipeline’s inception in 2015 to its completion in 2021. For example,
Germany sought to uphold and protect the transatlantic relationship, as well as Ukraine’s integrity,
while supporting an operation which purposefully aimed to undermine the transatlantic
relationship and threaten Ukraine’s sovereignty. In 2019, German President Frank-Walter
Steinmeier restated Germany’s commitment to upholding the transatlantic alliance between

144

Dave Keating. “Why the German Greens Want to Kill Nord Stream 2.” Energy Monitor, May 14, 2021.

145

Abby Klinkenberg. “Nord Stream II: Geopolitical and Environmental Hazard.” Fair Planet, September 19, 2021.

146

Abby Klinkenberg. “Nord Stream II: Geopolitical and Environmental Hazard.” Fair Planet, September 19, 2021.

74
Germany and America because “there can be no democracy without America” 147 but supported
the Nord Stream 2 pipeline because German-Russian energy relations is the “last bridge between
Russia and Europe.”148 In this sense, Germany wanted to have its cake and eat it too. Germany’s
support for the transatlantic alliance, Ukraine, and Nord Stream 2 demonstrated an impossible
scenario that the German coalition government was finally forced to see upon Russia’s second
invasion of Ukraine in February 2022.
3.4.6. Nord Stream 2: Through a European Lens
3.4.6.1. The European Union and European Parliament
The International Energy Agency defined energy security as “reliable, affordable access to
all fuels and energy sources.”149 Throughout history, Europe has been on the receiving end of
energy crises caused by geopolitical disagreements. Examples include the 1973 oil shock and the
European gas crises of 2006 and 2009. These events did not have enough of an impact to halt all
European imports of energy, but it was enough for the EU to recognize the risks involved with
importing almost all of the EU’s energy needs.
According to the European Parliament’s 2020 In-Depth Analysis on Energy security in the
EU’s external policy, 90 percent of the EU’s oil and 70 percent of gas are fulfilled through
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imports.150 The EU’s dependence on reliable and affordable energy suppliers for the survival of
the EU economy represented a significant vulnerability in the Union. As early as the year 2000,
the European Commission compared the EU’s dependence on imported energy to “Gulliver in
chains.”151 The EU was uncomfortable with the idea of relying on Russian exports so heavily and
had taken significant action to decrease its dependence on oil and gas imports through the
development of an uniform EU energy policy and promotion of renewable energy and integrated
European gas markets. But the failure to establish an EU energy policy and recruit enough sources
of renewable energy to supply Europe caused Russia to remain the “EU’s main energy partner for
the foreseeable future.”152 Therefore, until Europe’s energy infrastructure evolves with a greater
emphasis on a diversification of supply and renewable and green energy, Russia is Europe’s only
option.
Not only was energy security a key factor in upholding the EU’s economy, but it was also
a key factor in developing relations with non-EU states. Even though EU relations with Russia
were at an all-time low in 2021, the EU sought to maintain its strategy with Russia of pushing
back, containing, and engaging. 153 Considering the reliance the EU economy has had on imported
energy, the EU has focused its attention on preventing disruptions to supplies. Even though
renewable energy had been steadily increasing in EU states, it was not enough to supply the
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demand. Gas was considered an attractive option but due to the amount of time and money it takes
to build gas import infrastructure (pipelines and LNG terminals), gas imports are usually only
possible through long term contracts between exporter and importer. Russia’s excess gas and the
affordability of its exported gas makes Russia, to America’s disadvantage, the most attractive
partner for establishing gas relations, especially when other gas suppliers, such as North Africa
and the Middle East are unreliable due to frequent geopolitical strife.
Even though there was opposition to Nord Stream 2 in sectors of the German government,
the greatest opposition was found elsewhere in Europe, most openly from EU member states 154
and the Ukrainian government. There was also strong opposition within the Baltic states and
Central European countries, especially within the states that were former Soviet republics and
maintained a guarded approach to Russia. The EU’s opposition to Nord Stream 2 stemmed from
two factors: the detrimental effects the pipeline would have on Ukraine, as well as the realistic
European fear Russia would exploit Europe’s vulnerability and steep reliance on Russian energy
exports by weaponizing the pipeline.
The first factor that strengthened European opposition to Nord Stream 2 was the idea that
the Kremlin would “cut-off” gas to Europe as a means to secure its foreign policy objectives.
Convinced of the Kremlin’s malign intentions, European politicians and lawmakers from the
European Parliament called upon the European Commission in September 2021 to investigate the
“possible deliberate market manipulation by Gazprom and potential violation of EU competition
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rules.”155 Many European politicians accused the Kremlin of “deliberately worsening Europe’s
energy crisis” in the Fall 2021 with Moscow’s refusal to ship more natural gas via its long-standing
transit state Ukraine. The European politicians and lawmakers who called upon the European
Commission to investigate Gazprom’s corruptive acts stated there was a 280 percent increase in
wholesale gas prices in Europe as a result of Russia’s refusal to export more gas.156 A 2021 article
in the Financial Times also highlighted the decrease in Russian energy exports to Europe, accusing
the Kremlin of intentionally withholding energy in order to secure the full operation of Nord
Stream 2, whose certification process was still underway during the Fall 2021, “Pipeline exports
of natural gas from Gazprom to continental Europe have dropped roughly one-fifth in 2021 on prepandemic levels despite a sharp rebound in demand and low stockpiles of the important fuel.” 157
The second factor that strengthened European opposition to the Nord Stream 2 pipeline is
related to the financial pains the pipeline would have on Ukraine’s economy. Since Ukraine’s
Orange Revolution in 2004 and declaration to adopt a government of democracy, the EU has had
an interest in promoting the safety and independence of the pro-Western but non-EU state. The
EU’s interest in protecting and defending Ukraine’s sovereignty is even more important and
pressing now, with the ongoing and Russian instigated war in Ukraine.
Before Russia’s second invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, the EU was set on the
strategy of mediating gas talks between Ukraine and Russia and securing Ukraine’s revenues as a
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gas transit state for as long as Russia continued to deploy initiatives, like Nord Stream 2, that
circumvented Ukraine. Examples of EU states, specifically Germany, mediating energy relations
between Russia and Ukraine began as early as 2019, when the pipeline was over 94 percent
complete.158 Russia and Ukraine signed a five-year agreement for Ukraine to continue transiting a
minimum of 65 bcm of Russian natural gas to Europe until 2024. 159 The “pump or pay” deal gave
Ukraine extra security in that Russia must pay the minimum gas-transit fee, even if Russia refuses
to transit the contracted amounts through Ukraine. Russian Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev
described the deal as “a compromise that had to be reached” and Gazprom CEO Aleksei Miller
labeled the agreement as a “big package deal that restored the balance of interests between
parties.”160
Overall, the EU recognized the Nord Stream 2 pipeline as a controversial project and a
potential source of division in the Union. However, according to High Representative Josep
Borrell, the project was a “private endeavor” and the EU “does not have the means and tools to
decide what to do on Nord Stream 2.” Specifically, “it is a matter of private firms and it is a matter
of the Germans”. Despite some opposition to the pipeline, Borrell did not support the U.S.
sanctions enacted in 2017, 2019, and 2020 because of his opposition to “extraterritorial
sanctions.”161 European Commission President, Ursula von der Leyen, also voiced opposition to
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the U.S. sanctions because of the harm they impacted on European companies legally involved
with the project. 162 For example, the 2017 Countering Russian Influence in Europe and Eurasia
Act (CRIEEA), Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (CAATSA), the 2019
Protecting Europe’s Energy Security Act (PEESA), and the 2020 National Defense Authorization
Act (NDAA) were deemed “extraterritorial” because of the high costs they set on entities who
invest, facilitate, or provide services for the completion of Nord Stream 2.
Throughout EU discussion and debate, the decision to ultimately forgo Nord Stream 2
remained with Germany. Considering the pipeline was completed in September 2021, the EU
defends itself against corrupt or aggressive Russian business practices by applying internal market
legislation to Gazprom, the most significant being amending the 2009 Gas Directive in 2019 so
that it would apply to Nord Stream 2. Referencing the notion of unbundling, the Gas Directive
states Gazprom is prohibited from owning and supplying Nord Stream 2 with LNG. Lessening
Gazprom’s control over Nord Stream 2 was the EU’s attempt to divide the pipeline’s capabilities
among all receiving EU countries. The outcomes of the new EU legislation are unclear and have
not yet been applied considering Gazprom had challenged the directive and the conditions in which
the pipeline was allowed to operate. However, if the Nord Stream 2 pipeline does become
operational, Borrell hopes all EU states will work in a “non-discriminatory and transparent way
with an adequate degree of regulatory oversight, in line with the key principles of International
and European Union Energy law.”163
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3.4.6.2. The Baltic States
Despite dependence on Russian gas, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia,
Romania, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Croatia signed a petition against Nord Stream 2 in March
2016.164 The states in unified opposition to the pipeline addressed a letter to the then European
Commission President Jean-Claude Juncker, claiming Nord Stream 2 would result in “potentially
destabilizing geopolitical consequences,” and “strongly influence gas market development and gas
transit patterns in the region, most notably the transit route via Ukraine.” 165 The European
Commission did not confirm the receipt of this petition. Out of the nine petitioning states, Poland
and Lithuania stand out for importing shares of LNG from the United States. Despite a price
premium to do so, Poland and Lithuania preferred an increase in LNG pricing over maintaining
any dependence on Russian gas. 166 Poland used to depend heavily on Russian gas through the
Yamal pipeline but through great initiatives to decrease their dependence, Russian gas imports
have decreased from 74 percent in 2016 to 60 percent today. 167 In addition, Poland seeks to import
more Norwegian gas 168 and explore additional avenues for gas imports.
3.4.6.3. Ukraine
All of the opposition to Nord Stream 2 are traced to the impacts the pipeline would have
on Ukraine. The research clearly portrayed Nord Stream 2 as a Kremlin operation to bypass
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Ukraine and severely injure its economy and, subsequently, its ability to defend its national
sovereignty and become a contributing member of western institutions. Nord Stream 2 had even
been compared to a modern day Molotov-Ribbentrop pact, a reference to the non-aggression pact
between Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union that led to the invasion and partition of Poland. 169
The real threat to Ukraine through Nord Stream 2 was the pipeline’s ability to eliminate
Ukraine as a transit state for Russian energy exports and subsequently, eliminate Ukraine’s greatest
deterrent from Russian aggression. Ukrainian reformist leader and lawmaker, Svitlana Zalishchuk,
believed Ukraine’s transit network had prevented a full-scale Russian invasion and with the full
completion of Nord Stream 2, the Kremlin will no longer need to refrain from malicious aggression
in Ukraine in order to safeguard its gas supply. 170
Ukraine’s gas pipeline system, connection to underground storage facilities, and gas
deposits ranked Ukraine third in Europe in terms of gas potential. 171 Ukraine’s peak in gas
extraction occurred between 1973-1978 when the Soviet Union produced 68 billion cubic meters
of gas.172 Since the fall of the Soviet Union, Ukraine has suffered in gas production for three
reasons. First, gas fields from the Soviet-era are approximately 80% depleted, crippling Ukraine’s
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ability to meet its annual production goals. 173 Second, despite its 905 bcm of natural-gas
reserves,174 Ukraine lacked the necessary infrastructure and modern technology to seize its gas
producing potential. These issues were exacerbated by little to zero foreign investment in
Ukraine’s energy sector. Third, geopolitical tensions with Russia were at the height of Ukraine’s
difficulties, resulting from numerous geopolitical events, the most significant being Ukraine’s
independence following the collapse of the Soviet Union and the Soviet’s loss of their “little
brother” bordering state. Additional events include the Orange Revolution of 2004-2005, where
Ukrainians peacefully demonstrated their intent to distance themselves even further from their
former Soviet neighbor by forming a Western government, Russia’s illegal annexation of Crimea
in 2014, and the Russian appropriation of the Black Sea shelf, where the State Service of Geology
and Mineral Resources of Ukraine estimated the potential energy deposits of the Ukrainian sector
of the Black Sea measured 2.3 trillion cubic meters – enough to power Ukraine and contribute to
the European gas market. 175 Through all of these challenges, Ukraine has remained financially
dependent on its transit system. The gas transit system is integral to the Ukrainian government, as
demonstrated by the Ukrainian gas company, Naftogaz, being 100 percent owned and operated by
the national government. The operation of Ukraine’s transit system also has a direct effect on the
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Ukrainian economy, securing 1-1.5 billion dollars annually, 176 which is approximately 2 percent
of Ukraine’s GDP.177 But the ongoing disputes between Russia and Ukraine and Russia’s inability
to control Ukraine’s vast gas transportation system prompted Russia to construct various gas
pipelines to increase its gas export capacity, specifically through the elimination of Ukraine as a
transit country. Through the construction of direct pipelines that bypass Ukraine, Russia alleviated
itself from its dependence on Ukraine’s transit system. In addition to Nord Stream 2 (2021), other
Russian pipelines that eliminated the need for a transit state include Blue Stream (2003), Nord
Stream 1 (2012), and Turk Stream (2020).
Before the completion of the original Nord Stream pipeline that bypassed Ukraine, about
80 percent of Russia’s natural gas exports to Europe transited Ukraine and by 2018, with Nord
Stream in full operation, only 40 percent of those exports transited Ukraine. 178 Economically
speaking, Ukraine would lose over 2 billion dollars annually 179 in transit costs with the operation
of Nord Stream 2. In an attempt to compromise, Russia agreed to continue gas flow through
Ukraine until the end of 2024, helping Ukraine maintain some transit revenue. 180 However,
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Ukraine and many in the West doubt the sincerity of Russia’s “promise”, labeling it worthless the
day gas flows through Nord Stream 2.
Overall, the loss of transit revenue formed the basis for Ukraine’s opposition to Nord
Stream 2 because without its revenue as a transit country, Ukraine’s state owned and operated gas
company, Naftogaz, would be unable to maintain its pipeline network, since it is estimated that at
least 35-37 bcms of gas needed to be transported annually in order to keep the network
profitable.181 Unlike Gazprom with only 50 percent controlled by the Russian Federation, Naftogaz
would remain vulnerable to geopolitical issues as long as it was a state owned and operated
entity.182
Under Vladimir Putin, the Russian Federation has a nostalgic desire to restore the Soviet
Union. According to a 2020 poll conducted by the independent Levada Center, 60 percent of
participants regretted the dissolution of the Soviet Union, 63 percent believed the dissolution was
preventable, and 75 percent believed that “the Soviet era was the best time in Russia’s national
history, with a high level of prosperity and opportunities for ordinary citizens.”183 Seen throughout
history as Russia’s little brother, Ukrainians and Russians share centuries of a common history, to
the extent that the Kremlin does not recognize Ukraine’s sovereignty as a separate nation. 184
Seizing more control over Ukraine’s actions by eliminating Ukraine’s transit status and
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subsequently, crippling its economy, is one way in which Moscow threatened Ukraine’s
sovereignty. Scholars and policymakers viewed Russia circumnavigating Ukraine as a deliberate
effort to maximize Kremlin profits and subsequently, a direct attack on Ukraine's economy. 185
Ukrainian Deputy Minister for Economy, Trade and Agriculture, Taras Kachka says, “The
core motivation [for Nord Stream 2] for Russia is just to punish Ukraine.” 186 Even though the
majority of the literature supported this argument, a counter-argument existed when discussing the
pipeline from an economic point of view. For example, gas expert Anna Mikulska of Rice
University’s Baker Institute for Public Policy states, “it makes no sense from an economic or
contractual sense for any country to insist on transit fees. If the other side has a better alternative
and takes it, there is really no recourse.” 187 In addition, support for Ukraine’s transit revenue
maintained Ukraine’s dependence on Russia. Author and energy and political risk expert, Dr.
Agnia Grigas, says Russia’s decision to omit Ukraine as a transit country was not new considering
Russia had tried to eliminate transit states since the early 2000s because it made more sense for
Russia to do so from an economic and security standpoint. Grigas argues Russia’s decision to
eliminate transit states arises when it has a political fallout(s) with the transit state. Even though
losing its transit system will hurt economically, Grigas agrees it will be better for Ukraine because
it will cut off significant amounts of corruption and will provide Ukraine with the opportunity to
modernize economically and become more self-sufficient.188 In addition, rather than fight to
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maintain Ukraine’s status as a transit state for Russian gas by opposing Nord Stream 2, the West
should be aiding Ukraine in its modernization and technological innovations.
3.4.7. Nord Stream 2: Through an American Lens
The most vocal opponent of the Nord Stream 2 pipeline was the United States because of
its potentially dangerous effects on Ukrainian and European energy security, and the level of profit
Putin would secure for future acts of Russian aggression. Senior Advisor for Global Energy
Security, Amos Hochstein stated, “the U.S. has remained committed to supporting European
energy security for several decades, and that the U.S. views Nord Stream 2 as a purposeful breach
in European energy security and Ukrainian sovereignty.” 189 The Obama, Trump, and Biden
Administrations have all agreed the Nord Stream 2 project is a “bad deal for Europe” 190 because
of the European dependency it would create on Russian gas, as well as more opportunities for
Russian malign influence in Europe, and subsequently, a threat to western European ideals. As
early as 2016, when the pipeline was still in its planning phase, a senior official in the Obama
Administration highlighted the danger in entrusting Europe’s energy supply to one major supplier:
Russia. The senior official stated, “This doubling of one pipeline from one source, instead of
creating multiple routes from multiple sources across that territory, does not appear to enhance
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Europe’s energy security.”191 In this sense, Nord Stream 2 will seriously threaten or eliminate
European market competition entirely. 192 The U.S. also opposed the project because it gave
Moscow the ability to leverage the pipeline as a political weapon. Specifically, Russia would have
the ability to “turn off” the gas lever when geopolitical strife erupted, as was the case between
Russia and Ukraine in the gas crises of 2006 and 2009, and Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014.
Accusing Russia of weaponizing energy during Europe’s energy crisis in the last quarter
2021, Hochstein called on Moscow to send more gas via Ukraine since Russia had “consistently
said it has enough gas supply to [supply Europe], so if that is true, then they should, and they
should do it quickly through Ukraine.”193 As an alternative to Russian gas, the U.S. offered to
export its own LNG to European customers, labeling it “freedom gas.” 194 But U.S. opposition to
the project was so great, that it started even before the U.S. had the ability to sell LNG, as former
Ambassador to Germany, Richard Grenell stated in 2019.195
The U.S. demonstrated its opposition to Nord Stream 2 through a series of sanctions enacted in
2017, 2019, and 2020 under the Trump Administration. The sanctions had bipartisan support,
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believing enough economic pressure would halt or end the project altogether.196 This idea of
applying enough economic pressure to a key pillar of Russia’s economy was inspired by
Reagan’s Cold War policy and the U.S. victory over the Soviet Union.
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Figure 5 – Construction and Sanction Timeline of the Nord Stream 2 Pipeline
Source: European Parliament, 2021
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Pipeline construction ceased for a year due to the harsh conditions set by the U.S. sanctions.
Despite their continuation, in December 2020, pipeline construction continued as the Russian
vessel Fortuna began laying underwater pipeline sections in German waters. Following the
announcement construction had resumed, Gazprom’s shares jumped 3.9 percent. 197 Sending a
message of perseverance across the Atlantic, Russian Foreign Ministry’s spokeswoman, Maria
Zakharova announced, “We have both the program to implement the project, as well as specific
steps that should be taken, that will be taken in order to implement this project” and “we are also
aware that the United States of America won’t stop trying to prevent Russia from implementing
not only this project, but also its foreign policy and international activities in general.” 198 At the
same time, Germany had also discussed options to overcome U.S. sanctions through legal
mechanisms. Rolf Muetzenich, parliamentary leader for Germany’s Social Democrats believed
“Germany must prepare for a hard confrontation to defend its interests in the project that will
increase gas supplies from Russia.”199
Undesired by both the U.S. and Germany, the U.S. sanction legislation appeared to have
more of a negative effect on the U.S.-German transatlantic relationship than the pipeline’s
construction, which was 90 percent complete by the summer 2021. The bilateral relationship
already had experienced a divide, following a tumultuous four years of transatlantic divisionist
policy under President Trump and his anti-transatlantic rhetoric towards Chancellor Merkel. In
March 2021, CDU party member and Germany’s transatlantic coordinator, Peter Beyer called for
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a construction moratorium in an attempt to reconcile transatlantic relations, having labeled Nord
Stream 2 as a “serious stumbling block for the restart of transatlantic relations.” 200 The Biden
Administration, upon entering the White House in January 2021, was of the same opinion, and
adopted a different approach to the pipeline than the Trump Administration. Specifically, President
Biden waived sanctions on Nord Stream AG, the consortium for construction and operation of
Nord Stream 2, in order to relieve tensions across the Atlantic with Germany. Analysts with
ClearView Energy Partners agreed sanctions would only slow the pipeline’s construction, and that
the waiving of sanctions was a clear U.S. message to Berlin that the U.S. was willing to trade the
Nord Stream 2 pipeline for a stronger U.S.-EU partnership.201
President Biden faced significant pushback from both Democrats and Republicans
following the lifting of sanctions that targeted European and German businesses associated with
the successful completion of Nord Stream 2. The Biden Administration remained in open
opposition to the pipeline for the remainder of its construction but agreed that if five years’ worth
of sanctions were ineffective enough to not stop the pipeline, they risked injury to the transatlantic
relationship and Europe’s perception of America’s foreign policy. In this sense, President Biden
aligned his administration’s position with the literature in that the rift between Germany and the
United States would only deepen if the U.S. continued its “extraterritorial application of
sanctions.”202 According to the Biden Administration, it seemed a better deal for the transatlantic
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relationship for the U.S. to waive sanctions than maintain them and increase disagreement, only
to have the pipeline completed.
In an attempt to appease the disgruntled parties opposed to Biden’s withdrawal of sanctions
in May 2021, Germany and the U.S. struck a deal regarding the Nord Stream 2 pipeline in July
2021 that was for the sake of Ukraine and the EU’s energy security. Specifically, the transatlantic
allies agreed to invest more than 200 million euros in energy security in Ukraine and sustainable
energy across Europe. Germany and the U.S also agreed to levy sanctions against Russia if energy
was used as a tool of coercion or aggression towards Ukraine. Germany also agreed it would press
for additional measures at the European level. Following the bilateral agreement, an anonymous
senior State Department official stated that the United States and Germany are “resolutely
committed” to the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Ukraine.203 The bilateral agreement may
have achieved some reconciliation between Germany and the United States, but at the expense of
extreme disappointment and opposition from the Baltic States and Congress. Those who desired
to maintain a tough position against Germany’s support for the pipeline saw the deal creating a
“political, military, and energy threat for Ukraine and Central Europe, while increasing Russia’s
potential to destabilize the security situation in Europe.” 204 With U.S-European relations already
at an all-time low, the bilateral agreement also encouraged many states, like Ukraine, to view the
U.S. security guarantee with less credibility. Despite a negative response to the July 2021 joint
agreement on both sides of the Atlantic, both President Biden and German Chancellor Olaf Scholz
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upheld their ends of the agreement following Russia’s recognition of Luhansk and Donetsk on
February 22, 2022 and Russia’s full-scale military invasion of Ukraine two days later. Specifically,
Chancellor Sholz shelved the pipeline and the Biden Administration imposed the most intense
level of sanctions on Russia seen yet.
3.4.7.1. The Repetition of U.S. Policy in Europe
The actions of the Biden Administration towards Nord Stream 2 mirrored the actions of
the Reagan Administration during the construction of the 1982 Siberian pipeline. Specifically, the
U.S. policy response to Europe’s actions of the past mirrored the U.S. policy response to
Germany’s actions during the development of Nord Stream 2. Remaining within the theoretical
framework of interdependence, it is important to note how governmental actions have the potential
to influence patterns of interdependence. In other words, and referencing another attribute of
liberalism in the theory of interdependence, leadership matters. For example, Putin’s leadership of
Russia played a central role in the development of various levels of trust among EU member states
and Merkel’s sixteen years of leadership in Germany significantly contributed to the successful
development and construction of Nord Stream 2.
Additional examples of the importance of leadership in interdependence theory include the
historical case studies of the 1982 Siberian pipeline and the original 2012 Nord Stream pipeline.
Despite President Reagan’s determination to cut off Soviet gas flow to Europe through the Siberian
pipeline, Western European leaders prevailed in dictating the pipeline’s outcome, specifically
through its construction and operation, with little regard for the opinion of their transatlantic ally.
Most interestingly, the conceptualization of leadership from the 1982 Siberian pipeline to the
completion of Nord Stream 2 demonstrated how the leadership of the past mirrored the leadership
of today. Specifically, the sanctions Ronald Reagan enacted to stop the Siberian pipeline from total
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operation mirrored the sanctions enacted by Donald Trump, and, until he briefly waived sanctions,
of President Joe Biden. The European response to Trump’s actions also mirrored the European
response to Reagan’s. For example, EU High Representative for Foreign Policy, Josep Borrell
voiced his opposition to U.S. sanctions enacted by the Trump Administration in 2020, deeming
them “contrary to international law”. On July 17, 2020, Borrell gave a statement regarding his
growing concern at the increased use or threat of sanctions by the U.S. against European companies
and interests. He stated, “As a matter of principle the European Union opposes the use of sanctions
by third countries on European companies by carrying out legitimate business […] European
policies should be determined here in Europe, not by third countries.” 205 This language was similar
to statements made by former British Prime Minister, Margaret Thatcher, in response to sanctions
enacted by the Reagan Administration for the prevention of the 1982 Siberian pipeline. A 1982
New York Times article quotes her stating, “The question is whether one very powerful nation can
prevent existing contracts being fulfilled; I think it is wrong to do that.” 206 The article also included
statements from the foreign ministers of the European Economic Community, calling the sanctions
“an extraterritorial extension of U.S. jurisdiction.” 207
Another mirror to the past was Secretary of State Antony Blinken’s 1987 published book,
Ally Versus Ally: America, Europe, and the Siberian Pipeline Crisis, detailing the standoff between
the U.S. and Western Europe over the Soviet pipeline in the same manner the literature detailed
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the standoff between the U.S. and Germany over Nord Stream 2. For example, as a young author,
Blinken argued that U.S. policy toward the Soviet Union was less important than U.S. policy
toward its European allies. 208 The idea that the unity of the transatlantic alliance trumps the
response and/or outcome to Nord Stream 2 was reflected in Biden’s May 2021 decision to waive
sanctions on Nord Stream AG, because the continuation of sanctions would be “counter-productive
in terms of our European relations.”209 Secretary Blinken said Biden’s decision was in the U.S.
national interest, and demonstrated the administration’s “commitment to energy security in
Europe, consistent with the President's pledge to rebuild relationships with our allies and partners
in Europe.”210 The repetition in response and actions demonstrated how Nord Stream 2 was a
recycled story yet the West continued to respond as if it were a new one.
The purpose of conceptualizing the role of leadership in the EU and the United States and
its influence over the development of Nord Stream 2 was not to reveal what constitutes right or
wrong leadership but to bring awareness to the central role leadership has had in forming
interdependencies, especially the interdependent relationship between the EU and the Soviet
Union/Russia. For example, leadership has played a central role in the EU’s attempts to develop a
uniform energy policy because the leaders of EU member states have had differing opinions
regarding the EU’s approach to Russia. The inability to reach a consensus and form a common
opinion on Russia puts the EU’s chances of developing an uniform policy into an infinitesimal
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chance. As long as the EU remained divided in its approach to Russia, as analyzed in the ECFR
report, the EU would maintain both a high degree of sensitivity and vulnerability interdependence
to Russia and specifically, within the energy sector.
3.4.8. The Stalemate of Nord Stream 2
The construction of Nord Stream 2 was completed on September 10, 2021. For the next
165 days, the pipeline awaited certification from Germany’s Bundesnetzagentur (BNetzA), or
Germany’s Federal Network Agency in charge of regulating Germany’s gas market. BNetzA was
charged with the difficult task of deciding whether Nord Stream 2 AG, a Gazprom-owned but
Swiss-based company, could function independently from the Russian gas monopolist. BNetzA
was also charged with deciding whether the pipeline remained within EU law and specifically,
within the law of unbundling or the prevention of companies from owning both production/supply
of energy and the means of transmitting energy.211 BNetzA requested assistance for the
certification process from the Transmission System Operator of Ukraine (GTSOU) and Ukraine’s
national gas company, Naftogaz. Together, the three were expected to reach a final decision by
January 2022. GTSOU and Naftogaz’s addition to the certification team lessened the chance for
Nord Stream 2’s certification because they were “resolutely defending Ukraine’s interests within
this legal process,”212 as Olga Bielkova, GTSOU’s Director of Corporate Affairs stated.
The certification process faced a series of hurdles, including a suspension in midNovember 2021. The suspension resulted from BNetzA agreeing that Nord Stream 2 AG needed
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to form a German subsidiary company in order to comply with German and EU law. 213 The
suspension not only hiked European gas prices by almost 11 percent, but also pushed the pipeline’s
first gas flows past the desired start of January 2022. As Trevor Sikorski, analyst for the research
institute, Energy Aspects stated, “This does push back expected timelines quite a bit” so it was
“very unlikely” the pipeline would be operating in the first half of 2022.214 There was little
immediate commentary from the Kremlin regarding the suspension. However, Deputy Chairman
of the Russian Parliament’s upper house, Konstantin Kosachyov stated in an attempt to push for
faster certification, “Any delays in the pipeline certification, all the more so on the eve of winter,
is not in the interests of the European Union, that’s without any doubt.” 215
In the midst of the pipeline’s certification process, and on top of the suspension in
certification, Russia and specifically, Gazprom, was accused of withholding greatly needed energy
as means to secure a swift certification of Nord Stream 2. These accusations of Russian blackmail
were viewed by the pipeline’s opposition as the beginning of the weaponization of Nord Stream
2. Spokesperson for President Putin, Dmitry Peskov, rebuked by saying that a speedy certification
was possible and would “significantly balance price parameters for natural gas in Europe.”216 In
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May 2021, Russia’s ambassador to Germany, Sergei Nechayev, reminded all who questioned the
security and intentions of Nord Stream 2 with the following statement, “Moscow has been
cooperating with Germany on gas supplies for more than 50 years,” so much so that “it worked
even during the worst times of the Cold War. And now the question is whether we want to bury
10 billion euros on the seafloor.”217
The original trajectory of Nord Stream 2 and its certification spiraled off course following
Russia’s recognition of the Luhansk and Donetsk regions and Russia’s second invasion of Ukraine.
Following the Russian invasion of Ukraine on February 24, 2022, Chancellor Scholz made the
immediate decision to shelve the 11 billion euro Nord Stream 2 pipeline, making the project’s
future even more uncertain than during its tumultuous six-year development. Despite the global
concern over Biden’s decision to waive sanctions in May 2021, doubts regarding the U.S. and
German commitment to their July 2021 joint-agreement have been quelled due to Germany’s and
the United States’ response to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Specifically, Scholz declared the
situation with Nord Stream 2 after Russia’s invasion as “fundamentally different”, 218 asking Robert
Habeck, Federal Minister for Economic Affairs and Climate Action, to prevent the pipeline’s
certification.219 Following the February 2022 events in Ukraine, the future of Nord Stream 2
remained uncertain. Even though Scholz had retracted his support to Nord Stream 2 in light of
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Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, an action neither of his predecessors did 220, and despite the
geopolitical turmoil over the last six years and the consistent pressure of U.S. sanctions, 221 the
pipeline has been completed. The five European gas companies, Wintershall (Germany). Uniper
(Germany), Royal Dutch Shell (Netherlands), ENGIE (France), and OMV (Austria), not to
mention Gazprom, and its 51 percent of shares of the pipeline, seek repayment for the 11 billion
euros invested into the project. Therefore, it is unlikely those with the biggest stake in the future
of Nord Stream 2 will remain silent for long. Since the remaining shareholders of Nord Stream 2
are European gas companies, the final say may likely come from Europe, as Russia’s ambassador
to Germany, Sergei Nechayev stated, Nord Stream 2 “should be decided by Europe.” 222
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CHAPTER 4
CONCLUSION
The EU-Russian gas relationship emerged during the Cold War, when the Soviet Union
was ambitious to establish itself as an energy superpower and Europe’s main energy supplier. Due
to Europe’s increasing need for energy, Europe’s desire to establish relations with the East to
alleviate tensions, and the Soviet Union’s expansion of gas producing and exporting technologies,
the EU-Soviet/Russian relationship eventually evolved into a relationship of interdependence. The
relationship was further solidified with the successful completion and operation of the 1982
Siberian pipeline and despite the emerging challenges of the 21st century and the increased focus
on energy security in energy relations, was further solidified through the 2012 Nord Stream
pipeline. According to Germany, both pipelines were bilateral European-Soviet/Russian projects
representative of Ostpolitik or the means to overcome the East-West divide through peaceful
means of trade and communication.
Despite Germany’s commitment to the strategic foreign policy of Ostpolitik, the efficacy
of the “east policy” began to fray following the emergence of energy security in the global political
dialogue in the 21st century. Germany was also given the “mantle of leadership” 223 in the EU,
following Britain’s exit in 2016, and was therefore expected to lead the EU in developing a
common approach to Russia rather than maintain its strictly West German approach of Ostpolitik.
Germany was expected to lead at the front of the EU, not remain in the middle as the balancing act
between Russia and the West. The need to develop a new and uniform EU approach became
imperative following the accession of Vladimir Putin to the Russian presidency. Through his

223

“Put That in Your Pipe.” The Economist 423, no. 9046 (June 24, 2017).
https://www.economist.com/europe/2017/06/22/germanys-russian-gas-pipeline-smells-funny-to-america.

101
aggressive acts of foreign policy and clear separation of Russian values from Western values,
President Putin significantly cast doubt over the Western European idea that “change through
rapprochement” would bring Russia closer to the West. Examples of aggressive acts of Russian
foreign policy that demonstrated the Kremlin's intentions, damaged the historical and successful
efforts of Ostpolitik, and forced Europe to reconsider its gas relationship with Russia include the
2006 and 2009 Russian gas disputes with Ukraine, the illegal annexation of Crimea in 2014, the
2020 poisoning of Russian political opposition leader, Alexei Navalny, and the numerous hacking
attacks on the German parliament and United States government.
The Kremlin’s past fifteen years of successful acts of aggressive foreign policy and damage
in the western liberal order demonstrate the United States’ and Europe’s failure to strategically
respond to Moscow. Specifically within Europe, the EU has failed to strengthen and deploy its
greatest weapon against Russian aggression – its unity224 – because of various EU member states'
approaches to Russia and their individual energy needs. The Kremlin will continue to undermine
the solidarity of the EU until the EU overcomes its discord and establishes a strategic and
consistent approach to Russia and countering acts of Russian malign influence in Western Europe.
In addition, until the EU develops a uniform dialogue and policy on energy security, by decreasing
reliance on Russia and increasing its supply of renewable energy sources, the EU will remain
vulnerable in its relationship of interdependence with Russia.
In addition to increasing EU solidarity through a uniform EU energy policy and approach
to Russia, the EU has another weapon in which to defend itself against Russia – Russia’s own
vulnerability or the Russian economy’s reliance on gas exporting revenue. Russia and its economy
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is as dependent on the revenue from its gas consumers as the EU, and specifically Germany, is on
Russian energy. Germany used Russia’s vulnerability as an argument in defense of their support
for Nord Stream 2 and as insurance for entering into another economic project with Russia that
had the potential to severely undermine the western liberal order. In other words, the actions of
Germany and arguably, Russia, and their dedication to the completion of Nord Stream 2 were
supported by the theory of interdependence in that they viewed the relationship of interdependence
set between their two states as one stabilized by the needs or vulnerabilities of each party. As
delicate as the relationship of interdependence may have seemed to the United States who casted
doubt over the security of a relationship based on interdependence, it was unlikely to collapse if
its collapse would result in greater costs than the risks involved in entering a relationship of
interdependence.
Interdependence theory states that the consistent fulfillment of each states’ strongest
vulnerabilities provides for a mutually beneficial relationship, lays the foundation for a relationship
of interdependence, and any actions by a state or actor that would offset the stability of the
relationship, would result in serious costly effects to all actors involved. Despite the costs and
benefits associated with a stable relationship of interdependence, specifically the historically
engrained relationship of interdependence between Russia and Germany, the relationship is
currently at an all-time low and in a crisis-driven state due to the current environment in Europe.
What has occurred in Europe since February 2022 cannot be explained nor supported by the theory
of interdependence because Russia’s actions in Ukraine go against what the theory predicts or
expects states engaged in a relationship of interdependence to do. In other words, interdependence
theory would not have imagined Russia’s second invasion of Ukraine as a plausible occurrence
because of how solidified the relationship of interdependence and how great the vulnerabilities of
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Russia and the Russian economy had become. Due to the fact that Russia’s actions cannot be
explained nor supported by interdependence theory, the aftermath of Nord Stream 2 demonstrates
a clear limitation and failure of Keohane’s and Nye’s theory.
Therefore, with Russia’s unjustified, second invasion of Ukraine, there is reason to believe
that even the historically ingrained relationship of interdependence between Germany and Russia,
as grounded as it seemed to have been, despite all opposition, through the completion of the Nord
Stream pipeline, has the potential to evolve in the context of new events. For example, and as was
demonstrated through Chancellor Olaf Scholz’s actions, the multi-decade development of a
pipeline could be canceled in as little time as one day. Therefore, as grounded as the literature
demonstrates relationships of interdependence to be, whether stable or crisis-driven relationships
of interdependence, current events propose new evidence and reveal limitations of the
interdependence theory. Specifically, that interdependencies are more sensitive to geopolitical
influence than originally thought.
Based on what we know from interdependence theory and current events, Nord Stream 2
would have only become a successful representation of interdependence between the EU and
Russia, similar to the 1982 Siberian and 2012 Nord Stream pipelines, if Russia had not invaded
Ukraine, costing Nord Stream 2’s operation and a gradual decrease of all European imports of
Russian energy, all significant hits to the Russian state and economy. However, even though the
current situation in Europe represents a failure of the interdependence theory, it is not certain that
the relationship of interdependence cannot or will not regain its former stability, thereby allowing
interdependence theory to regain some credibility. Germany clearly declared their position on
Nord Stream 2 through its cancellation, but there is no certainty they, or the rest of Western Europe
will maintain this position. In other words, Germany could resurrect the former relationship of
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interdependence that supports or is within the framework of interdependence theory. Despite the
atrocities occurring in Ukraine, this is a possibility considering Germany re-established relations
with Russia following their strong condemnation of Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014 with
the discussion for Nord Stream 2 in 2015. Therefore, not only is the future of Nord Stream 2
incumbent upon the war in Ukraine, but so is the historically ingrained relationship of
interdependence and re-applicability of interdependence theory to the EU-Russian and
specifically, the German-Russian relationship.
What once represented a relationship of interdependence between Russia, the EU, and
specifically, Germany, Nord Stream 2 now represents a stalemate in EU-Russia energy relations.
Due to Russia’s February 2022 invasion of Ukraine, Germany and Russia’s position of Nord
Stream 2 as a purely economic and commercial venture has lost significant credit while the
opposition’s position of Nord Stream 2 as a strategic Kremlin-operated project to weaponize gas
for political advantage, reigns dominant, with the most credibility. As unlikely as the future
operation of Nord Stream 2 seems, it is determinant upon the outcome in Ukraine and the West’s
response to Russia and specifically, Putin’s actions. As demonstrated throughout this thesis, only
one thing is certain – that the world’s debate on the Nord Stream 2 pipeline harks back to a decades
long relationship of interdependence between the EU and Russia and specifically, Germany and
Russia. Through the six-year development of Nord Stream 2, U.S. transatlantic relations, U.S.German relations, and relations within the EU faced significant challenges because of the
significant disagreement in approach to Russia and the pipeline. As of now, Nord Stream 2 sits
beneath the Baltic Sea, unused and untouched, awaiting its fate as either a physical representation
of the interdependencies between Russia and Germany or as a colossal memory, portraying the
former relationship of interdependence between Russia and Germany.

105
BIBLIOGRAPHY

Andres, Richard B., and Michael Kofman. 2011. “European Energy Security: Reducing
Volatility of Ukraine-Russia Natural Gas Pricing Disputes.” National Defense University.
Kramer, Andrew E. 2021. “Why Nord Stream 2 Is Back in the Spotlight.” The New York Times,
October 13, 2021. https://www.nytimes.com/2020/09/14/world/europe/nord-stream-2russia-germany.html.
Apostolicas, Paul. 2020. “Evolving Markets: LNG and Energy Security in Europe.” Harvard
International Review 41 (2).
https://www.proquest.com/docview/2570253162?accountid=12967&parentSessionId=dD
RdWRPbx8hJmV1FWChNoOciMVnZELMa9FHgx07dD%2Bc%3D&pqorigsite=primo.
Atlantic Council. 2018. Book Launch: The New Geopolitics of Natural Gas. YouTube.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1WsgzS2h-OI&t=2555s.
———. 2022. How Germany Can Best Support Ukraine. YouTube.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=cCWvrBR47Y0&t=2859s.
Bachmann, Rüdiger, Moritz Kuhn, Andreas Peichl, David Baqaee, Andreas Löschel, Karen
Pittel, Christian Bayer, Benjamin Moll, and Moritz Schularick. 2022. “What If? The
Economic Effects for Germany of a Stop of Energy Imports from Russia.” Policy Brief
028. ECONtribute Markets & Public Policy.
https://www.econtribute.de/RePEc/ajk/ajkpbs/ECONtribute_PB_028_2022.pdf#page=4.
Baer, Daniel. 2018. “Ukraine’s Not a Country, Putin Told Bush. What’d He Tell Trump about
Montenegro?” The Washington Post, July 19, 2018.
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/posteverything/wp/2018/07/19/ukraines-not-acountry-putin-told-bush-whatd-he-tell-trump-about-montenegro/.
Ball, George W. 1982. “The Case Against Sanctions.” The New York Times, September 12,
1982. https://www.nytimes.com/1982/09/12/magazine/the-case-against-sanctions.html.
Barry Buzan: Concepts of Security. 2010. YouTube.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WU4RjPJ4sAM.
Barry Buzan: Threat Construction. 2010. YouTube.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=DIljrbRnfY4.
Barry Buzan: What Is Security? 2010. YouTube.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1MTuzqgaook.
Belkin, Paul, Michael Ratner, and Cory Welt. 2021a. “Russia’s Nord Stream 2 Pipeline:
Continued Uncertainty.” Congressional Research Service.
https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/IF/IF11138.
———. 2021b. “Russia’s Nord Stream 2 Natural Gas Pipeline to Germany.” Congressional
Research Service.
———. 2021c. “Russia’s Nord Stream 2 Natural Gas Pipeline to Germany.” Congressional
Research Service. https://crsreports.congress.gov.
Bertrand, Natasha, and Andrew Desiderio. 2021. “Biden’s Russia Pipeline Dilemma Just Got
Worse - and He Has Ted Cruz to Thank.” Politico, March 5, 2021.
Berzina, Kristine. n.d. “Europe’s Gas Crisis and Russian Energy Politics: Experts Respond.”
Ukrainian Research Institute, Harvard University.

106
Blank, Stephen, and Younkyoo Kim. 2016. “Economic Warfare a La Russe: The Energy
Weapon and Russian National Security Strategy.” The Journal of East Asian Affairs, 1–
39.
Borrell, Josep. 2021. “Russia: Speech by High Representative/Vice-President Josep Borrell at the
EP Debate.” European External Action Service (EEAS).
https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/97446/russia-speech-highrepresentativevice-president-josep-borrell-ep-debate_en.
Bradshaw, Michael J. 2009. “The Geopolitics of Global Energy Security.” Geography Compass
3 (5): 1920–37.
Bros, Aurelie, Tatiana Mitrova, and Kirsten Westphal. 2017. “German-Russian Gas Relations.”
German Institute for International and Security Affairs. https://www.swpberlin.org/en/publication/german-russian-gas-relations.
Burchard, Hans von der. 2022. “Scholz: Germany Will Discuss Nord Stream 2 Penalties If
Russia Attacks Ukraine.” Politico, January 18, 2022. https://www.politico.eu/article/olafscholz-consequence-nord-stream-two-russia-attack-ukraine/.
Casier, Tom. 2011a. “The Rise of Energy to the Top of the EU-Russia Agenda: From
Interdependence to Dependence?” Geopolitics, no. 16: 536–52.
———. 2011b. “The Rise of Energy to the Top of the EU-Russia Agenda: From
Interdependence to Dependence?” Geopolitics 16 (3): 536–52.
Champion, Marc, and Daryna Krasnolutska. 2021. “Ukraine Worries Less About Gas But More
About War.” Bloomberg, September 24, 2021.
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2021-09-24/nord-stream-2-pipeline-newsukraine-worries-less-about-gas-more-about-war.
Chazan, Guy. 2009. “Russian Pipelines Get Acceptance from U.S.” The Wall Street Journal
Europe, November 27, 2009.
Ciesnik, Sonya. 2022. “Nord Stream 2: Russia-Germany Gas Pipeline Becomes a Geopolitical
Lever.” France 24, January 30, 2022. https://www.france24.com/en/europe/20220130nord-stream-2-russia-germany-gas-pipeline-becomes-a-geopolitical-lever.
Colgan, Jeff D. 2013. “Fueling the Fire: Pathways from Oil to War.” International Security 38
(2): 147–80.
Commission of the European Communities. 2006. “Green Paper: A European Strategy for
Sustainable, Competitive and Secure Energy.” https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legalcontent/EN/TXT/?uri=legissum:l27062.
Dezem, Vanessa, Brian Parkin, and Olga Tanas. 2020. “Nord Stream 2 Work Resumes Despite
U.S. Efforts To Stop It.” Bloomberg, December 11, 2020.
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-12-11/german-lawmakers-weighsanction-proof-structure-on-nord-stream-2.
Medvedev, Dmitry. 2011. “Dmitry Medvedev Speech at EU-Russia Summit.” Official Internet
Sources of the President of Russia.
http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/14008.
Dziggel, Oliver C. 2016. “The Reagan Pipeline Sanctions: Implications for U.S. Domestic Policy
and the Future of International Law.” Towson University Journal of International Affairs
1 (1): 137.
Eddy, Melissa. 2021. “Germany Wants Its Russian Pipeline. German Allies Aren’t Sure It’s a
Good Idea.” The New York Times, December 28, 2021.

107
https://www.nytimes.com/2021/12/28/world/europe/nord-stream-pipeline-germanyrussia.html.
Elliot, Stuart. 2021. “Norway-Based DNV GL Halts Nord Stream 2 Certification Work on US
Sanctions.” S&P Global Platts, January 4, 2021.
https://www.spglobal.com/platts/en/market-insights/latest-news/natural-gas/010421norway-based-dnv-gl-halts-nord-stream-2-certification-work-on-us-sanctions.
Esakova, Nataliya. 2012. European Energy Security: Analysing the EU-Russia Energy Security
Regime in Terms of Interdependence Theory. 1st ed. Globale Gesellschaft Und
Internationale Beziehungen. VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften GmbH.
Euronews. 2021. “Nord Stream 2 Is a Bad Idea and a Bad Deal for Europe, US’ Antony Blinken
Tells Euronews,” March 25, 2021. https://www.euronews.com/2021/03/25/nord-stream2-is-a-bad-idea-and-a-bad-deal-for-europe-us-antony-blinken-tells-euronews.
European Commission. 2000. “Green Paper - Towards a European Strategy for the Security of
Energy Supply.” European Union Law. https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legalcontent/EN/TXT/?uri=celex:52000DC0769.
———. 2020. “Energy, Transport, and Environment Statistics.” European Union.
https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/documents/3217494/11478276/KS-DK-20-001-ENN.pdf/06ddaf8d-1745-76b5-838e-013524781340?t=1605526083000.
———. n.d. “Third Energy Package.” https://energy.ec.europa.eu/topics/markets-andconsumers/market-legislation/third-energy-package_en.
Evans, Caroline. 2021. “U.S. Waiving Some Nord Stream Natural Gas Pipeline Sanctions, but
Still Opposes European Project.” Natural Gas Intelligence, May 20, 2021.
https://www.naturalgasintel.com/u-s-waiving-some-nord-stream-natural-gas-pipelinesanctions-but-still-opposes-european-project/.
“Fact Sheet: Nord Stream by Numbers.” 2013. Nord Stream.
Feron, James. 1982. “Mrs. Thatcher Faults U.S. on Siberia Pipeline.” The New York Times, July
2, 1982.
https://timesmachine.nytimes.com/timesmachine/1982/07/02/250775.html?pageNumber=
1.
———. n.d. “Mrs. Thatcher Faults U.S. on Siberia Pipeline.”
Francis Masson. 2018. “Nord Stream: The Narrative of a New Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact?”
History and Memory, November 2018.
“About Gazprom.” 2022. Gazprom. 2022. https://www.gazprom.com/about/.
Garner, Dwight. 2011. “Visions of an Age When Oil Isn’t King.” The New York Times,
September 20, 2011. https://www.nytimes.com/2011/09/21/books/the-quest-by-danielyergin-review.html.
“Gas Wars: The Problem with Nord Stream 2.” 2019. BBC News.
https://www.bbc.com/news/av/world-europe-47166669.
Gazprom. n.d. “Nord Stream.” Gazprom. https://www.gazprom.com/projects/nord-stream/.
General Secretariat of the Council. 2009. “European Security Strategy: A Secure Europe in a
Better World.” Council of the European Union.
“Germany Wants Its Russian Pipeline. German Allies Aren’t Sure It’s a Good Idea.” n.d.
Gotev, Georgi. 2022. “Analysis: In Ukraine Crisis, Germay Faces Tough Decisions over Nord
Stream 2.” Euractiv, January 21, 2022. https://www.euractiv.com/section/globaleurope/news/analysis-in-ukraine-crisis-germany-faces-tough-decisions-over-nord-stream2/.

108
Graupner, Hardy. 2022. “Can Ukraine Do without Russian Gas Transit Fees?” Deutsche Welle
(DW), January 28, 2022. https://www.dw.com/en/can-ukraine-do-without-russian-gastransit-fees/a-60552279.
“Green Paper: Towards a European Strategy for the Security of Energy Supply.” 2000.
Commission of the European Communities.
Grigas, Agnia. 2019. “The New Geopolitics of Energy.” CISAC Stanford, October 8.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=EImxZfGJN9o.
Güney, Nurşin Ateşoğlu, and Vişne Korkmaz. 2014. “The Energy Interdependence Model
between Russia and Europe: An Evaluation of Expecations for Change.” Perceptions
XIX (3): 35–58.
Hayes, Mark H., and David G. Victor. 2004. “Factors That Explain Investment in Cross-Border
Natural Gas Transport Infrastructures: A Research Protocol for Historical Case Studies.”
Program on Energy and Sustainable Development.
https://pesd.fsi.stanford.edu/publications/factors_that_explain_investment_in_crossborde
r_natural_gas_transport_infrastructures_a_research_protocol_for_historical_case_studies
Hernandez, America. 2021. “German Official Calls for Construction ‘moratorium’ on Nord
Stream 2 to Repair US Relations.” Politico, March 31, 2021.
https://www.politico.eu/article/german-official-calls-for-construction-moratorium-onnord-stream-2-to-repair-us-relations/.
Hochstein, Amos. 2021. Online Press Briefing with Amos Hochstein, Senior Advisor for Global
Energy Security. https://www.state.gov/briefing-with-amos-hochstein-senior-advisor-forglobal-energy-security/.
Jennen, Birgit. 2021. “Germany’s U.S. Envoy Urges Temporary Halt to Nord Stream Link.”
Bloomberg, April 1, 2021. https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2021-0401/german-transatlantic-envoy-urges-halt-to-nord-stream-pipeline.
Kannewurff, Brandon T. von. 2019. “Undermining ‘The Deal of the Century’: The Siberian
Natural Gas Pipeline & the Failure of American Economic Pressure on the Soviet Energy
Industry.” James Blair Historical Review 9 (2).
https://scholarworks.wm.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1152&context=jbhr.
Kardás, Szymon. 2019. “The Great Troublemaker.” International Issues & Slovak Foreign
Policy Affairs 28 (3).
Keohane, Robert O., and Joseph S. Nye Jr. 1987. “Power and Interdependence Revisited.”
International Organization 41 (4): 725–53.
Keohane, Robert O., and Joseph S. Nye. 1989. Power and Interdependence. Second Edition.
Harper Collins Publishers.
———. 2012. Power and Interdependence. Fourth Edition. Longman.
Khrennikova, Dina, and Anna Shiryaevskaya. 2021. “Why the World Worries About Russia’s
Nord Stream 2 Pipeline.” The Washington Post, September 13, 2021.
https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/energy/why-the-world-worries-about-russiasnord-stream-2-pipeline/2021/09/10/303613ac-1239-11ec-baca-86b144fc8a2d_story.html.
Klinkenberg, Abby. 2021. “Nord Stream II: Geopolitical and Environmental Hazard.” Fair
Planet, September 19, 2021.
Knight, Ben. 2021. “The History of Nord Stream.” Deutsche Welle (DW), July 23, 2021.
https://www.dw.com/en/the-history-of-nord-stream/a-58618313.

109
Kramer, Andrew E. 2006. “Russia Cuts Off Gas to Ukraine in Cost Dispute.” The New York
Times, January 2, 2006. https://www.nytimes.com/2006/01/02/world/europe/russia-cutsoff-gas-to-ukraine-in-cost-dispute.html?
———. 2009. “Russia Cuts Off Gas Deliveries to Ukraine.” The New York Times, January 1,
2009. https://www.nytimes.com/2009/01/02/world/europe/02gazprom.html.
———. 2021. “Pipeline Politics: Why Nord Stream 2 Is Back in the Spotlight.” The New York
Times, October 13, 2021. https://www.nytimes.com/2020/09/14/world/europe/nordstream-2-russia-germany.html.
Krickovic, Andrej. 2015. “When Interdependence Produces Conflict: EU-Russia Energy
Relations as a Security Dilemma.” Contemporary Security Policy 36 (1): 3–26.
https://doi.org/10.1080/13523260.2015.1012350.
Leonard, Mark, and Nicu Popescu. 2007. “A Power Audit of EU-Russia Relations.” London:
European Council on Foreign Relations. https://ecfr.eu/wp-content/uploads/ECFR02_A_POWER_AUDIT_OF_EU-RUSSIA_RELATIONS.pdf.
“Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG).” n.d. Office of Fossil Energy and Carbon Management: U.S.
Department of Energy. https://www.energy.gov/fecm/liquefied-natural-gas-lng.
Łoskot-Strachota, Agata. 2009. “Gazprom’s Expansion in the EU: Co-Operation or
Domination?” Warsaw: Ośrodek Studiów Wschodnich.
https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/113176/GP_EU_10_09_en.pdf.
Lough, John. 2021. “Russia Outmaneuvered Germany on Nord Stream 2 and Now the Whole of
Europe Is Paying the Price.” The Telegraph, September 22, 2021.
https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2021/09/22/russia-outmanoeuvred-germany-nordstream-2-now-whole-europe/.
Loveday, Morris. 2021. “Germany’s Rising Green Party Echoes Many U.S. Policies. That Could
Rattle Pipeline Plans from Russia.” The Washington Post, May 13, 2021.
https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/europe/germany-greens-nordstream-russiamerkel/2021/05/12/ba3ce31e-6bae-11eb-a66e-e27046e9e898_story.html.
Macias, Amanda. 2021. “U.S., Germany Strike a Deal to Allow Completion of Controversial
Russian Nord Stream 2 Pipeline.” CNBC, July 21, 2021.
https://www.cnbc.com/2021/07/21/us-germany-strike-deal-to-allow-completion-ofrussian-nord-stream-2-pipeline.html.
Maio, Giovanna De. 2019. “Nord Stream 2: A Failed Test for EU Unity and Transatlantic
Coordination.” Brookings, April 22, 2019. https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-fromchaos/2019/04/22/nord-stream-2-a-failed-test-for-eu-unity-and-trans-atlanticcoordination/.
Malley, CE. 2021. “Natural Gas Pipeline Threatens Ukraine and Splits the EU.” The
Organization for World Peace. https://theowp.org/reports/natural-gas-pipeline-threatensukraine-and-splits-the-eu/.
Mandel, Jacob. 2021. “Environmental Group Sues for Nord Stream 2 Cancellation.” Argus, May
10, 2021. https://www.argusmedia.com/en/news/2213475-environmental-group-sues-fornord-stream-2-cancellation.
Marsh, Sarah, and Madeline Chambers. 2022. “Germany Freezes Nord Stream 2 Gas Project as
Ukraine Crisis Deepens.” Reuters, February 22, 2022.
https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/germanys-scholz-halts-nord-stream-2certification-2022-02-22/.

110
Masters, Jonathan. 2021. “Ukraine: Conflict at the Crossroads of Europe and Russia.” Council
on Foreign Relations, December 2, 2021. https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/ukraineconflict-crossroads-europe-and-russia.
Miller, Chris. 2020. “The Ghost of Blinken Past.” Foreign Policy, December 3, 2020.
https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/12/03/blinken-secretary-state-alliances-nato-ally-versusally/.
Mourlon-Druol, Emmanuel and Angela Romano. 2018. “The Iran Nuclear Deal Crisis: Lessons
from the 1982 Transatlantic Dispute over the Siberian Gas Pipeline.” Bruegel (blog).
May 23, 2018. https://www.bruegel.org/2018/05/the-iran-nuclear-deal-crisis-lessonsfrom-the-1982-transatlantic-dispute-over-the-siberian-gas-pipeline/.
Mushaben, Joyce. 2009. “Madam Chancellor: Angela Merkel and the Triangulation of German
Foreign Policy.” Georgetown Journal of International Affairs 10 (1): 9.
Newman, Nicholas. 2018. “Big Politics at Work Behind Nordstream 2.” Pipeline & Gas Journal
245 (2): 39–41.
Noël, Pierre. 2009a. “Beyond Dependence: How to Deal with Russian Gas.” European Council
on Foreign Relations. https://ecfr.eu/wp-content/uploads/ECFR-09BEYOND_DEPENDENCE-HOW_TO_DEAL_WITH_RUSSIAN_GAS.pdf.
———. 2009b. “Beyond Dependence: How to Deal with Russian Gas.” University of
Cambridge, February 3. http://www.eprg.group.cam.ac.uk/wpcontent/uploads/2009/02/pn_howtodealwithrussiangas_090203.pdf.
Nord Stream. 2016. “Nord Stream Background Information.” https://www.nordstream.com/press-info/library/.
“Nord Stream Delivers Gas to Lubmin.” n.d. Nord Stream. https://www.nordstream.com/operations/.
Office of Political and Economic Research. 1981. “USSR-Western Europe: Implications of the
Siberia-to-Europe Gas Pipeline.” Intelligence Assessment 22308. National Foreign
Assessment Center. https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/DOC_0000500594.pdf.
Oltermann, Philip. 2022. “Ghosts of Germany’s Past Rise as Olaf Scholz Seeks Strategy for
Ukraine.” The Guardian, January 30, 2022. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/ja
n/30/olaf-scholz-germany-ukraine-strategy-ghosts.
Pifer, Steven. 2021a. “Ukraine: Six Years after the Maidan.” Brookings, February 21, 2021.
https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2020/02/21/ukraine-six-years-afterthe-maidan/.
———. 2021b. “Nord Stream 2: Background, Objections, and Possible Outcomes.” Policy Brief.
Brookings. https://www.brookings.edu/research/nord-stream-2-background-objectionsand-possible-outcomes/.
———. 2021c. “Nord Stream 2: Background, Objections, and Possible Outcomes.” Brookings.
https://www.brookings.edu/research/nord-stream-2-background-objections-and-possibleoutcomes/.
Prince, Todd. 2020. “U.S. Senator Confident Nord Stream 2 Will Be Stopped As Russia Hurries
To Complete Pipeline.” Radio Free Europe, December 17, 2020. Prince, Todd, “U.S.
Senator Confident Nord Stream 2 Will Be Stopped as Russia Hurries to Complete
Pipeline” RadioFreeEurope, Dec 2020.
Prokip, Andrian. 2020. “A New Era of Gas Wars between Ukraine and Russia?” The Wilson
Center. Kennen Institute (blog). November 23, 2020. https://www.wilsoncenter.org/blogpost/new-era-gas-wars-between-ukraine-and-russia.

111
“Put That in Your Pipe.” 2017. The Economist 423 (9046).
https://www.economist.com/europe/2017/06/22/germanys-russian-gas-pipeline-smellsfunny-to-america.
Putin, Vladimir. 2006. “Vladimir Putin’s Speech at Meeting with the G8 Energy Ministers.” The
University of Toronto. http://www.g8.utoronto.ca/energy/energy_putin060316.html.
[R-CA-39], Representative Edward R. Royce. 2017. H.R.3364 - Countering America’s
Adversaries Through Sanctions Act. https://www.congress.gov/bill/115thcongress/house-bill/3364/actions.
Rees, Tom. 2021. “Putin’s Iron Grip on Energy Leaves Europe Increasingly Vulnerable.” The
Telegraph, September 22, 2021.
https://www.telegraph.co.uk/business/2021/09/22/putins-iron-grip-energy-leaves-europeincreasingly-vulnerable/.
Reuters. 2021. “Germany’s Greens Vow to Scrap Russian Gas Pipeline after Election,” March
19, 2021. https://www.reuters.com/article/us-germany-election-greens-nordstream/germanys-greens-vow-to-scrap-russian-gas-pipeline-after-electionidUSKBN2BB0ZS.
Reznikov, Oleksii. 2021. “Reject Nord Stream 2 Once and for All; The Pipeline Puts Ukraine’s
National Security at Serious Risk.” The Wall Street Journal, April 8, 2021.
RFE/RL. 2019. “European Commission President Criticizes U.S. Nord Stream Sanctions.” Radio
Free Europe, December 27, 2019. https://www.rferl.org/a/european-commissionpresident-criticizes-u-s-sanctions-on-nord-stream/30347898.html.
Roaraune, Finn, and Rolf Golombek. n.d. “The Future of Russian Gas Exports.”
Roaraune, Finn, Rolf Golombek, Arild Moe, Knut Einar Rosendahl, and Hilde Hallre Le Tissier.
2017. “The Future of Russian Gas Exports.” Economics of Energy and Environmental
Policy 6 (2).
Röhrkasten, Sybille, and Kirsten Westphal. 2012. “Energy Security and the Transatlantic
Dimension: A View from Germany.” Journal of Transatlantic Studies 10 (4).
Russell, Martin. 2020. “Energy Security in the EU External Policy.” In-Depth Analysis.
European Parliamentary Research Service.
———. 2021. “The Nord Stream 2 Pipeline: Economic, Environmental and Geopolitical Issues.”
European Parliamentary Research Service.
https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2021/690705/EPRS_BRI(2021)69
0705_EN.pdf.
“Russia: Speech by High Representative/Vice-President Josep Borrell at the EP Debate.” n.d.
Schmid, Nils. 2021. “How We Can Reach Transatlantic Agreement on Nord Stream 2.”
International Politics and Society, February 17, 2021. https://www.ipsjournal.eu/topics/foreign-and-security-policy/how-we-can-reach-transatlantic-agreementon-nord-stream-2-4975/.
Schmitt, Benjamin. 2021. “Biden Must Freeze Putin’s Pipeline and Prevent This ‘Bad Deal for
Europe.’” The Atlantic Council, February 25, 2021.
https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/ukrainealert/biden-must-freeze-putins-pipelineand-prevent-this-bad-deal-for-europe/.
“Second Strategic Energy Review: An EU Energy Security and Solidarity Action Plan.” 2008.
Brussels: Commission of the European Communities.
Shalal, Andrea, Timothy Gardner, and Steve Holland. 2021. “U.S. Waives Sanctions on Nord
Stream 2 as Biden Seeks to Mend Europe Ties.” Reuters, May 19, 2021.

112
https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/us-waive-sanctions-firm-ceo-behind-russiasnord-stream-2-pipeline-source-2021-05-19/.
Slobodian, Nataliia. 2018. “Political Technologies of Russian Energy Diplomacy.” Nowa
Polityka Wschodnia 1 (16): 49–65. https://doi.org/DOI: 10.15804/npw20181603.
Stent, Angela. 2021. “Trump’s Russia Legacy and Biden’s Response.” Survival: Global Politics
and Strategy 63 (4).
Strategic Studies. 1985. “Siberian Gas Pipeline.” Institute of Strategic Studies Islamabad 8 (3):
10–16.
Sullivan, Arthur. 2022. “Russian Gas in Germany: A Complicated 50-Year Relationship.”
Deutsche Welle (DW), March 9, 2022. https://www.dw.com/en/russian-gas-in-germanya-complicated-50-year-relationship/a-61057166.
Sytas, Andrius. 2016. “EU Leaders Sign Letter Objecting to Nord Stream-2 Gas Link.” Reuters,
March 16, 2016. https://www.reuters.com/article/uk-eu-energy-nordstream/eu-leaderssign-letter-objecting-to-nord-stream-2-gas-link-idUKKCN0WI1YV.
Szymon, Kardás. 2019. “The Great Troublemaker.” International Issues & Slovak Foreign
Policy Affairs 28 (3).
The Atlantic Council. 2022. How Germany Can Best Support Ukraine.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=cCWvrBR47Y0.
The Library of Congress. 1982. “Soviet Pipeline 1982.” Congressional Research Service.
https://www.everycrsreport.com/files/19821022_IP0219S_d8bc44c63e6d2816a3fc8cbe2
61e4338ac65de49.pdf.
“The Polish Crisis of 1981-1982.” 1981. The Margaret Thatcher Foundation. July 1981.
https://www.margaretthatcher.org/archive/us-reagan%20%28Poland%29.
The Russian Ministry of Energy. 2010. “Energy Strategy of Russia.”
http://www.energystrategy.ru/projects/docs/ES-2030_(Eng).pdf.
Vicari, Madalina Sisu. 2016. “How Russian Pipelines Heat Up Tensions: From Reagan’s Battle
Over Yamal To The European Row On Nord Stream 2.” Vocal Europe, April 21, 2016.
Victor, David G., Mark H. Hayes, and Amy M. Jaffe. 2006. Natural Gas and Geopolitics: From
1970 to 2040. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Voytyuk, Oksana. n.d. “The Gas Sector of Ukraine: Past and Future.” In .
https://doi.org/10.4467/20827695WSC.20.012.13340.
Weise, Zia. 2022. “Germany Shelves Nord Stream 2 Pipeline.” Politico, February 22, 2022.
https://www.politico.eu/article/germany-to-stop-nord-stream-2/.
Wettengel, Julian. 2022. “Factsheet: Gas Pipeline Nord Stream 2 Links Germany to Russia, but
Splits Europe.” Clean Energy Wire. https://www.cleanenergywire.org/factsheets/gaspipeline-nord-stream-2-links-germany-russia-splits-europe.
Whist, Bendik Solum. 2008. “Nord Stream: Not Just a Pipeline.” 15. Fridtjof Nansens Institutt.
https://www.osti.gov/etdeweb/servlets/purl/950539.
“Yamal-Europe.” n.d. Gazprom. https://www.gazprom.com/projects/yamal-europe/.
Yergin, Daniel. 2011. Daniel Yergin Examines America’s “Quest” For Energy.
https://www.npr.org/transcripts/140606249.
———. 2014. 10 Questions with Author and Energy Expert Daniel Yergin.
https://www.energy.gov/articles/10-questions-author-and-energy-expert-daniel-yergin.
———. 2020. The New Map: Energy, Climate, and the Clash of Nations. First Edition. New
York: Penguin Press.

113
Ziegler, Charles E. 2012. “Energy Pipeline Networks and Trust: The European Union and Russia
in Comparative Perspective.” International Relations 27 (1): 3–29.
https://doi.org/10.1177/0047117812460879.
Zinets, Natalia, and Vladimir Soldatkin. 2014. “Russia Cuts off Gas to Ukraine as Kiev Orders
Border Secured.” Reuters, June 16, 2014. https://www.reuters.com/article/us-ukrainecrisis/russia-cuts-off-gas-to-ukraine-as-kiev-orders-border-securedidUSKBN0ER16X20140616.

114
“

APPENDIX
LIST OF U.S. SANCTIONS ON THE NORD STREAM 2 PIPELINE

Section 232 of the Countering Russian Influence in Europe and Eurasia Act of 2017 (CRIEEA)
Enacted in 2017
Updated on July 15, 2020
CRIEEA targets Russia for its malign behavior in aggressive actions towards the United States,
our Allies and partners. CRIEEA seeks to protect the energy security of U.S. partners with a
focus on energy export pipelines and specifically, Nord Stream 2. CRIEAA sanctions individuals
who knowingly, on or after August 2, 2017 significantly aided Russia’s ability to construct
energy pipelines.
Source: “CAATSA/CRIEEA Section 232 Public Guidance” U.S. Department of State
National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA)
Introduced May 13, 2021
Became law on December 27, 2021
NDAA for Fiscal Year 2022 includes multiple issues. NDAA includes authorization for the
Department of Defense (DOD) to impose sanctions on entities responsible for operating or
constructing the Nord Stream 2 pipeline.
Source: Summary of H.R.4350 – 117th Congress (2021-2022)
Counting America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (CAATSA)
Enacted on August 2, 2017
Updated on July 15, 2020
CAATSA targets Russia in response to Russia’s aggressive actions against the United States, her
Allies, and partners. CAATA seeks to protect the energy security of our European allies while
working with EU member states and European institutions to provide a liberal and diverse
energy market.
Sanctions on KVT-RUS and FORTUNA
Enacted on January 19, 2021
FORTUNA is the Russian vessel used by Gazprom in the construction of the Nord Stream 2
pipeline and KVT-RUS is a Russia-based entity. KVT-RUS was sanctioned in accordance with
Section 232 of CAATSA for aiding in the construction of Nord Stream 2, specifically, for
knowingly selling, lessing, or providing to Russia necessary goods, services, technology,
information, or support for Nord Stream 2’s construction. The Biden Administration continued
sanctions on FORTUNA and KVT-RUS on February 22, 2021 as a part of PEESA.
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Source: “Sanctions on Russian Entity and a Vessel Engaging the Construction of Nord Stream
2”. Press Statement. U.S. Department of State
Protecting Europe’s Energy Security Act of 2019 (PEESA)
Enacted in 2019
Amended on April 9, 2021
PEESA sanctions all vessels and foreign persons involved in the construction of Nord Stream 2.
Specifically, vessels and individuals involved in the selling, leasing, provision, or facilitation of
construction.
Source: “Protecting Europe’s Energy Security Act (PEESA) as Amended”. Press Statement. U.S.
Department of State
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